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STATE REGULATION OF SUBDIVISIONS: DEFINING 
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL 
LAND USE JURISDICTION IN VERMONT, MAINE, 
AND FLORIDA 
Thomas R. McKeon* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The growth of state control over land use invites immediate con-
troversy.l Land use control traditionally has been part of the realm 
of local government.2 To some landowners, the idea of local govern-
ment having a say in what they do with their own property is difficult 
to accept-allowing state or regional government to interfere would 
be intolerable.3 Opponents of state control consider a layer of bu-
reaucracy beyond local planning boards a burden on development 
and a deterrent to economic growth. 4 Yet, to supporters of state 
control, leaving to local government the protection of our nation's 
increasingly precious land from profit-seeking landowners and de-
velopers would be a national tragedy. 5 These proponents assert that 
• Executive Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 ROBERT G. HEALY & JOHN s. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES 1 (2d ed. 1979). 
2 Id. 
S See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, OrHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY 12 (1976). Siegan equates the 
right to do as one chooses with one's property with a civil right. Id. at 13. One of developers' 
most common complaints is that there are already too many governmental agencies requiring 
permits, resulting in a good deal of overlap, inefficiency, and confusion. See FRED P. BOSSEL-
MAN ET AL., THE PERMIT EXPWSION 20 (1976). 
4 See HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 212. 
6 See id. at 4-7. Unless local government has the political will to enforce land use powers, 
local zoning laws do not provide protection against environmental degradation. Arthur E. 
Palmer, Environrrumtally Based Land Use Planning and Regulation, 2 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 25, 64 (1984). 
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a state or regional system of control is crucial for acceptable, envi-
ronmentally sound growth. 6 
State approaches to land use regulation range from leaving land 
use decisions entirely to local governmenF to assuming control over 
land use through a variety of methods.8 The few state governments 
that have attempted direct regulation of land use have tried to 
compromise between the proponents and detractors of state control 
by leaving regulation of small-scale development to local government 
while reviewing more significant developments themselves.9 
State agencies that regulate land use in general and subdivisions 
in particular must define their jurisdiction to best serve the purpose 
of their enabling statute. At the same time, however, they must not 
expand their jurisdiction to cover those types of subdivisions that 
would be inefficient for the state to review and thus better left to 
local government. 10 This balance is difficult to strike. The best defi-
nition of jurisdiction would be readily apparent to landowners and 
developers, so that they would be able to plan ahead knowing their 
status with the state agency. 11 The definition also would be compre-
hensive enough that developers could not evade review on projects 
that the state intended to regulate. 12 Unfortunately, a definition of 
jurisdiction that is efficient, consistent, and clear may leave loopholes 
that destroy the purpose of the state statute. 13 On the other hand, 
an overly comprehensive or flexible definition of state jurisdiction 
may not be easily discernable and could result in both uncertainty 
and burdensome procedures, which would be necessary simply to 
discover whether a given project is subject to review. 14 
6 See HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 2. 
7 See 5 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 33.01[1)[a) n.1 (1991). 
Until the interest in other forms of land use control surfaced in the 1970s, the standard form 
of land use regulation was a state zoning enabling act that granted power to local governments 
to carry out local zoning ordinances. 5 id. § 33.01[1)[b). Some states have taken minimal steps 
beyond local enabling acts, permitting inter-local agreements and county zoning of unincor-
porated areas. Id. 
S See infra notes 40-41 for a discussion of different types of state and regional land use 
control. 
9 See Jonathan N. Brownell, State Land U.se Regulation~Where Are We Going? 9 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 29, 30-31 (1974). 
10 Id. 
11 .Tames P. W. Goss, Hear No Evil, See No Evil: In re Spencer and the Twilight of Judicial 
Scruiiny in Vermont, 14 VT. L. REV. 501, 528 (1990). 
12 See inlra notes 311-12 and accompanying text. 
13 Id. 
14 See infra notes 313-14, 343-46 and accompanying text. 
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This Comment focuses on the state programs in Maine and Ver-
mont, which have taken direct responsibility for certain subdivision 
regulation, and in Florida, where the jurisdictional framework of the 
state land use control program provides a more flexible approach to 
determining whether the state or the local government has the 
power of review. Each of these three states has faced serious juris-
dictional problems. Each has amended its land use statute several 
times in order to find more workable definitions of the state land use 
program's jurisdiction. 15 
All three states have approached the problem differently, but each 
has faced the same major issues. Their legislatures and agencies 
have had to decide whether to base jurisdiction on the amount of 
land that a particular individual or corporation subdivides-a person-
based jurisdiction-or on the size or nature of the particular piece 
of land at issue-a land-based jurisdiction.16 They also have had to 
decide what criteria to use in determining the types of development 
and subdivision to review17 and how flexible the thresholds that those 
criteria determine should be. 18 
This Comment proposes a workable, efficient method of determin-
ing state jurisdiction over land subdivision. Section II summarizes 
the evolution and rationale of state involvement in the regulation of 
land use. Section III provides a detailed review of the ways in which 
legislatures, state agencies, and courts have approached jurisdiction 
issues in the states of Vermont, Maine, and Florida. Section IV 
compares and contrasts the approaches of these states in their de-
termination of jurisdiction. Section V concludes that, given liberal 
judicial scrutiny and agency self-restraint, the most workable and 
efficient method of determining state jurisdiction over subdivisions 
is a land-based jurisdiction, with thresholds based on rigid criteria 
and staggered by location to reflect environmentally fragile areas. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF STATE INTEREST IN LAND USE AND THE 
JURISDICTION ISSUE 
Land use control in the United States traditionally has been the 
domain of local government. 19 The rationale underlying the concept 
1{; See infra notes 84-98, 188-96, 252, 276 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 301-31 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text. 
19 HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 1. 
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of local control is that only local governments have both sufficient 
knowledge of the land in question and the ability to provide citizens 
with the influence necessary to plot the future course of their neigh-
borhoods. 20 Therefore, most states have passed enabling statutes 
that grant zoning power to municipal and county governments, which 
then may choose to exercise the powers granted. 21 Local control of 
land use regulation was virtually the only form of land control from 
the 1920s until about 1970.22 
In the 1960s and 1970s, advocates for tighter land use control 
believed that local control was insufficient to cope with certain kinds 
of growth.23 State control, its proponents believed, was necessary 
for development that had an impact on areas larger than a local 
government was able to regulate under traditional zoning standards, 
and for development located in areas where a state had a special 
interest.24 The pressures that created an interest in state control25 
included heightened environmental awareness,26 municipalities' 
weak technical capabilities27 and their inability or reluctance to use 
their control powers,28 the ability of state government to direct 
development where it is needed most,29 and the tendency for some 
communities to use zoning as an exclusionary tool. 30 For these rea-
sons, there was a need for more control of residential and commercial 
growth than the minimum standards local communities tended to 
enact and enforce. 31 
20 I d. at 212. 
21 See 5 ROHAN, supra note 7, at § 33.01[1] n.1. Many localities also passed subdivision 
control laws in order to make sure that subdivisions fit structurally into the town. 7 id. 
§ 45.01[1][a]. 
22 5 id. § 33.01. 
23 See FRED S. BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE 
CONTROL I, 17 (1972). 
24 Id. 
25 For a general discussion of the rationale for the state regulation of land use, see HEALY 
& ROSENBERG, supra note I, at 7-145; 5 NORMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING 
LAW, § 160.09, at 602 (1985). 
26 5 WILLIAMS, supra note 25, § 160.09, at 602. 
~ Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 
169-73, 336 A.2d 713, 722-24 (1975). States can attack exclusionary zoning by creating a state 
land planning agency. See Massachusetts Anti Snob Zoning Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40B, 
§§ 20-23 (1979 & Supp. 1991). 
31 HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note I, at 7. 
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Thus began a "quiet revolution" in which the land use control 
powers that states once granted municipalities began to revert to 
their source.32 In 1964, the American Law Institute began work on 
the first draft of its Model Land Development Code: a model land 
use statute that, intended to replace the Standard Zoning Enabling 
Act, contained a role for the states. 33 Some states designed 
their own statutes that created state agencies or regional commis-
sions to regulate growth.34 Even the federal government debated 
a land use bill that would have facilitated state control over land 
use.35 
Out of respect for the ability of local governments to make many 
local land use decisions fairly and efficiently, states asserting control 
over land use have limited the jurisdictions of their land use agen-
cies. 36 They have taken different approaches when defining the scope 
of state or regional control of land use. One approach has been to 
follow the Model Code, which submits any development that is of 
regional impact or affects an area of critical concern to extra scrutiny 
under a state-mandated procedure before approval. 37 A second ap-
proach has been to use criteria such as size to differentiate between 
developments of state concern and those of only local concern. 38 The 
state then directly regulates any development of state concern, sub-
jecting that development to both state and local control. 39 A third 
approach has involved zoning the whole state and letting local au-
32 Id. at 1; see also Ernest J.T. Loo, Note, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative 
Analysis, 45 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1154, 1160-75 (1977). For a list of sources on the history 
of state land use, see Myrl L. Duncan, Agriculture as a Resource: Statewide Land Use 
Programs for the Preservation of Farmland, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 440 n.40 (1987). 
33 MODEL LAND DEV. CODE x-xi (Complete Text and Commentary 1975) [hereinafter 
MODEL CODE]. Article Seven of the Model Land Development Code mandates state control 
over both "areas of critical concern" and "developments of regional impact." Id. § 7. This 
Comment explains the Model Code in more detail infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text. 
34 See the statutes listed infra notes 37-41. 
36 Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act, S. 268, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 
also HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 271-73. 
36 Brownell, supra note 9, at 30-31; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at 271 n.2. 
37 MODEL CODE, supra note 33, §§ 7-201, 7-301. Florida is the only state to base its land 
use program substantially on the Model Code. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.12 (West 1988 
& Supp. 1991). Two Massachusetts regional commissions also are based on the Code. 1989 
Mass. Acts 716; 1974 Mass. Acts 637; see infra note 215. 
38 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); see infra 
notes 165-206 and accompanying text. 
39 Maine and Vennont have adopted this approach. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-
490 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6090 (1984 & Supp. 1991); see 
infra notes 44-206 and accompanying text. 
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thorities make zoning decisions based on state-enacted criteria and 
under state supervision.40 There are other variations as well. 41 
40 This zoning approach, which Hawaii and Oregon have adopted, means that although all 
development is subject to state law, the state and local governments split enforcement re-
sponsibilities. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -18 (1985 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 197.005-.850 (1985 & Supp. 1991). Numerous states, to a lesser degree, have implemented 
state management of local zoning. For a general discussion, see Douglas R. Porter, Do State 
Growth Management Acts Make a Difference? Local Growth Management Measures Under 
Different State Growth Policies, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1991). 
Hawaii has the oldest state land use statute in the nation, dating back to 1961. 5 ROHAN, 
supra note 7, § 33.03[1]. Its State Land Use Commission has divided all land in the state into 
four districts. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-2 (1985). Almost half of the land is conservation land 
strictly controlled by the Hawaii Board of Land and Natural Resources. 5 ROHAN, supra note 
7, § 33.03[2]. Another five percent is classified as urban and is under local jurisdiction only. 
[d. State and county government share control over the remaining land, which is zoned as 
either agricultural or rural. [d. The state lists permitted uses that are designed to protect 
agricultural land. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-4.5 (1985). The county then zones locally. [d. § 205-
5(b). The state hand is heavy as the counties' ability to permit any subdivision in these two 
districts is strictly limited. [d. § 205-4.5(b). For a general discussion of the Hawaiian approach, 
see 5 ROHAN, supra note 7, § 33.03[2]. 
Oregon takes a different, highly touted, approach. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.850 (1985 
& Supp. 1991); Jennifer J. Johnson & Laurie A. Bennett, The Oregon Example: A Prospect 
for the Nation, 14 ENVTL. L. 843, 851 (1984). The legislature created the Land Conservation 
and Development Commission. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005 (1991). It required the Commission 
to establish 19 different land use goals. [d. § 197.040. Local governments must create local 
comprehensive plans that comply with those goals. [d. Once the Commission approves such a 
plan, the local government can regulate development. [d. Any land dispute in a locality may 
be appealed to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals. [d. § 197.810. The state goals extend 
to virtually all land use decisions. See 5 ROHAN, supra note 7, § 33.03[4][c]. 
41 Numerous states exert lesser degrees of influence on land use regulation within their 
boundaries. Several states have protected environmentally sensitive areas through statutes 
based on the Model Code's areas of critical state concern. MODEL CODE, supra note 33, § 7-
201. In these states, once the state designates an area of critical concern for environmental 
or historic reasons, then development within that area must go through a state or state-
mandated local review process. John M. DeGrove, Critical Area Programs in Florida: Cre-
ative Balancing of Growth and the Environment, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. AND CONTEMP. L. 
51, 58 (1988). These states include Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina (in 
coastal areas), Oregon, and Wyoming. [d. at 57. Other states have created a state land use 
agency but endowed it merely with advisory powers. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65-
103 (1988). 
Another approach is to designate an area as important or fragile and create a regional 
planning agency to regulate development in that area. States adopting this approach have 
drawn jurisdictional boundaries between the regional commissions and local government. 
Principles defining the jurisdiction of a regional commission are often the same as those defining 
the jurisdiction of a state agency. For example, in California, the San Francisco Bay Conser-
vation and Development Commission has total jurisdiction over all land use decisions, but the 
geographical boundaries of its jurisdiction are confined to within 100 feet landward from the 
high-tide mark. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66604, 66610 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). In addition, the 
California Coastal Commission requires each locality within its jurisdiction to create a local 
land use program. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30500 (West 1985). The Commission then reviews 
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The "quiet revolution" never did sweep the nation. 42 In the late 
1970s, attitudes towards government regulation changed, and the 
federal government, as well as many states, lost interest in extra-
local land use regulation. 43 In many states, however, the state land 
use control programs remain. Those states are still struggling, up 
to twenty years later, to define where their regulatory power ends 
and purely local power begins. 
III. STATE LAND USE REGULATION: JURISDICTION OVER 
SUBDIVISIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN VERMONT, MAINE, AND 
FLORIDA 
A. Vermont'.,; Act 250 
In the 1960s, Vermont began a period of accelerated economic 
growth.44 A combination of factors-including the popularity of Ver-
mont's recreational opportunities such as skiing, its natural beauty, 
and its new-found accessibility from metropolitan Boston, Hartford, 
and New York due to the construction of interstate highways-
triggered extensive economic growth and the development of rural 
land. 45 That growth had characteristics that made many Vermonters 
each local program. Id. § 30519. The legislature returned much of the Commission's authority 
to the localities in 1976. 5 WILLIAMS, supra note 25, § 160.49, at 774-75. 
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection requires permits for certain 
types of commercial and industrial development in coastal areas, including residential devel-
opments of 25 or more dwelling units. N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:19-3(5) to -6 (1979). New Jersey 
also has created regional commissions. See id. § 13:17 (1979 & Supp. 1991) (Hackensack 
Meadows Development Commission has complete zoning powers within region); id. § 13:18A 
(Supp. 1991) (Pinelands Commission requires local zoning to conform with regional guidelines, 
and can review any local zoning decision). 
New York created, with regard to its Adirondack Mountains, one of the most pervasive 
jurisdictions of any state or regional planning agency. N. Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 800-820 (McKinney 
1982 & Supp. 1991). It endowed the Adirondack Park Agency with three major tools to control 
land use. First, the agency can designate different land use districts, for which it creates 
regionwide "intensity guidelines" that apply to all subdivisions and other development for 
local authorities to follow. I d. § 805. Second, it creates special rules for shorelines that it 
considers sensitive. Id. § 806. Third, it requires a permit for ali subdivisions and other 
development with a regional impact. I d. § 809. A complicated set of thresholds that vary with 
the type of land use district determine what the agency permits and what is left to the 
localities. Id. § 810; see infra note 340. 
42 HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note I, at 1-2. Only 16 states had passed state or regional 
land use control laws as of 1985. 5 WILLIAMS, supra note 25, § 160.01. 
43 See SIEGAN, supra note 3, at 70-73. 
44 HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 41. 
•• Id; see also 5 ROHAN, supra note 7, § 33.03 n.66 (1990); Duncan, supra note 32, at 403. 
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uneasy.46 They found disturbing the subsequent decline in agricul-
ture, the threat to Vermont's fragile ecology, the strain on municipal 
services, and the potential for a change in Vermont's "way of life."47 
Many municipalities never had adopted zoning laws, lacking the 
resources or the interest to control development.48 Municipalities 
with such an interest found themselves overmatched by large de-
velopers.49 
In response to this discomfort with growth, the Vermont legisla-
ture in 1969 passed the Vermont Land Use and Development Law, 
popularly known as "Act 250."50 The Act set up a permitting system 
that seven district commissions and a statewide Environmental 
Board administer. 51 It requires any individual or corporation to ac-
quire a permit before either constructing a "development" of a cer-
tain size for commercial or industrial purposes or subdividing land 
into a minimum number of lots. 52 
46 HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 41. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. 
50 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
51 [d. §§ 6021, 6025-6027, 6081. The ability of the state to influence subdivisions extends 
beyond Act 250. Through the enabling legislation granting land use control powers to munic-
ipalities, the state also exercises some safety and health controls over what the local govern-
ments regulate. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4413 (1975 & Supp. 1991). Furthermore, subdivisions 
that Act 250 does not cover are subject to state health and sewage regulation. VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1218-1220 (1982 & Supp. 1991). 
The original Act 250's intent to have a statewide land use plan was never fulfilled. HEALY 
& ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 40. The plan that the Environmental Board adopted in 1974 
did not make it through the legislature after a wave of public sentiment opposed it. [d. The 
state since has set up regional land use commissions with the power to create regionwide land 
use plans and provide advisory services. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4341-4362 (1975 & Supp. 
1991). Each regional commission is formed after a vote of the involved municipalities. [d. 
§ 4341. It is limited to an advisory role. [d. §§ 4345-4345(a). 
Vermont also controls rampant land speculation through a unique capital gains tax on the 
sale of land that was owned for a short period of time. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-
10010 (1981 & Supp. 1991). The less time a seller owns land, the greater percentage of the 
profit from the sale goes to capital gains. [d. § 10003. The same 1987 amendment that 
substantially changed many aspects of Act 250 jurisdiction also amended the capital gains tax 
statute. 1987 Vt. Laws 64, §§ 6-12. The amendments were partly designed to let fewer 
subdividers and land speculators avoid either state regulation or taxes designed to control 
growth. [d. § 1. 
Other state agencies have shown an interest in land use control by exercising their right to 
bring suit under Act 250. Goss, supra note 11, at 504-10. These agencies may playa significant 
role in Vermont land use. [d. The Environmental Board, however, remains the only statewide, 
direct regulator of subdivisions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6081(a) (1984). 
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1. The Act 250 Permitting Process 
A person or corporation begins the Act 250 process by applying 
to the district commission for a permit. 53 The commission either can 
deny, issue, or conditionally issue the permit. 54 The commission bases 
its decision on criteria that the statute lays out. 55 Applicants may 
appeal commission decisions to the Environmental Board56 and, if 
they wish, to the Vermont Supreme Court. 57 Questions concerning 
the Act's jurisdiction, however, take another route. A subdivider or 
a developer may ask a district commission coordinator for an advi-
sory opinion as to whether the Act's jurisdiction applies to its par-
ticular subdivision or development. 58 The applicant can appeal the 
coordinator's opinion to the executive officer of the Environmental 
Board.59 Neither of these opinions are binding. Binding jurisdictional 
decisions come from the Board itself in the form of a declaratory 
judgment.60 Thus, developers seeking a binding decision either may 
go directly to the Board or may appeal from an executive officer 
opinion. 61 
Petitioners may appeal Environmental Board decisions to the Ver-
mont Supreme Court. 62 As the overseer of the state's administrative 
agencies,63 the court has held that the Board cannot go beyond the 
intentions of its statute when making rules.64 The court also has held 
that, when the statute is unclear, uncertainty is to be resolved in 
favor of the property owner.65 Generally, the court has the tools to 
preserve the statute's intent to leave developments of lesser conse-
quence in the hands of local government. 66 
63 Id. §§ 6086-6087 (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
64 Id. 
66 Id. The criteria include the development or subdivision's effect on air and water pollution, 
water supply, soil erosion, transportation conditions, educational and other municipal services, 
and the historic or aesthetic nature of the location. Id. 
56 Id. § 6089. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. § 6007(c); Vt. Envtl. Bd. Rule 3(C) (1982). 
59 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6007(c). 
60 Vt. Envtl. Bd. Rule 3(D) (1982). 
61 Id. at 3(C)-(D). 
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089 (1984). 
63 In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 76, 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1982). 
64 Id. at 76, 444 A.2d at 1352. 
66 In re Vitale, 157 Vt. 580, 584, 563 A.2d 613, 616 (1989). 
66 Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. at 76, 444 A.2d at 1352. 
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In reality, although the court has overturned Board decisions,67 it 
typically grants the Board a great deal of deference,68 giving the 
Board's interpretations of its enabling statutes a presumption of 
validity.69 Moreover, the Board's authority received a boost when 
the court ruled that the state legislature's ratification of the Board 
rules gave them the force of statute. 70 All in all, the court's deference 
has enabled the Board to broaden and strengthen state jurisdiction 
over subdivisions. 71 
2. Act 250's Jurisdiction over Subdivisions 
Although the motivation behind Act 250 was a desire to control 
all the land in the state, the Vermont legislature limited the scope 
of the law to prevent the bureaucratic difficulties that would ensue 
if the state assumed the entire burden of subdivision control. 72 As a 
result, determining jurisdiction has caused difficulties for property 
owners and regulators since the Act's inception. 73 The resulting 
legislative and administrative wrangle has plagued Act 250 as the 
legislature and the Board have wrestled over the question of how 
67 See id. at 80, 444 A.2d at 1354; Committee to Save the Bishop's House, Inc. v. Medical 
Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 137 Vt. 142, 151, 400 A.2d 1015, 1020 (1979). 
66 Vitale, 157 Vt. at 588, 563 A.2d at 615. One critic strenuously has argued that the 
Vermont Supreme Court has failed in its supervision of Vermont's Environmental Board. 
Goss, supra note 11, at 510. 
Id. 
The Vermont Supreme Court's practice of strictly construing land use regulations in 
favor of property owners has been severely eroded. In the past few years, the Court 
has adopted increasingly expansive interpretations of state and local governments' 
ability to regulate land use at the expense of traditional common law property rights. 
In reviewing decisions of administrative agencies, the Court has not engaged in a 
deferential standard of review, but has written a blank check to agencies in their 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
66 In re Burlington Hous. Auth., Declaratory Ruling No. 124, 143 Vt. 80, 83, 463 A.2d 215, 
217 (1983). 
70 In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 334, 566 A.2d 959, 962-63 (1989). This ruling has had a large 
impact on the Board as its rules now cannot be ultra vires. Interview with Aaron Adler, 
Assistant Executive Officer to the Environmental Board, in Montpelier, Vt. (Oct. 29, 1990) 
[hereinafter Adler interview]. The Board is now uncertain whether it can amend the rules 
without legislative approval. Id. 
71 See infra notes 107-18, 151-64 and accompanying text. 
72 In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 76, 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1982). According to the 
Vermont Supreme Court, "[t]he Act was a philosophic compromise between a desire to protect 
all the lands and environment of the state of Vermont, and the need to avoid an administrative 
nightmare." Id.; cf Committee to Save the Bishop's House, Inc. v. Medical Center Hosp. of 
Vt., Inc., 137 Vt. 142, 151, 400 A.2d 1015, 1020 (1979) (intent of legislature in Act 250 was 
only to become involved in land use decisions where activity on major scale is planned). 
73 Brownell, supra note 9, at 31. Jonathan Brownell was one of the framers of Act 250. 
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much state regulation is appropriate. 74 The concept of the state 
regulating major subdivision activity and large commercial and in-
dustrial developments while leaving the remainder to the localities 
has prevailed in spite of questions about the system's efficiency and 
fairness. 75 
Act 250's jurisdiction applies to any individual or corporation who 
sells or offers to sell any interest in any "subdivision," commences 
construction on a "subdivision" or "development," or commences a 
"development" without a permit. 76 According to the Act, a "subdi-
vision" is created when a person or corporation that owns or controls 
tracts of land within the area of a district commission divides that 
land into ten or more lots within a period of five years. 77 The Act 
defines a "development" as any commercial or industrial develop-
ment involving more than ten acres of land in a municipality with 
zoning and subdivision laws, or any such development involving only 
one acre in a municipality without zoning and subdivision laws. 78 
This Comment focuses on state jurisdiction over subdivisions. Ver-
mont's problems defining its jurisdiction over subdivisions have come 
from the Act's definitions of "control,"79 "person,"80 and "subdivi-
sion, "81 and from the shift in emphasis from the land itself to the 
person subdividing it. 82 Using Act 250's definition of "development," 
the state has managed to extend its review power over subdivisions, 
creating further controversy. 83 
3. Act 250's Definitions of "Subdivision" and "Control" 
The original Act 250 defined "subdivision" as a tract84 or tracts of 
land, owned or controlled by a person, that for the purpose of resale 
74 Stephanie J. Kaplan, The Effect of Act 250 on Prime Farmland in Vermont, 6 VT. L. 
REV. 467, 501 (1981). 
75 Id. 
76 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6081(a) (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
77 Id. § 6001(19). 
78 Id. § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
79 See infra notes 105-27 and accompanying text. 
80 See infra notes 128-50 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text. 
82 See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
83 See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text. 
84 Act 250 defines "tract" as one, undivided, uninterrupted parcel of land. In re New 
England Assocs., Declaratory Ruling No. 175, at 5 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1987). Therefore, property 
divided by a road or stream already constitutes two tracts and is not subdivided when one 
parcel is sold. Id.; see infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maine's 
approach. 
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have been divided into ten or more lots both within a radius of five 
miles of any point on any lot and within any continuous period of ten 
years.85 It defined "lot" as an interest in land of less than ten acres. 86 
The definition of "lot" spawned the first battle over jurisdiction.87 In 
order to avoid Act 250 review, developers would create so-called 
"spaghetti" lots: thin lots with short road frontage extending far 
enough back to surpass ten acres.88 The first major statutory revision 
of the Environmental Board's jurisdiction came with the 1984 amend-
ment to Act 250 that dropped the ten-acre exception from the defi-
nition of "lot. "89 
The most significant revision of the state jurisdiction occurred in 
1987, when the Vermont legislature sought to close certain loopholes 
in the law. 90 The primary thrust of the 1987 amendment was rede-
fining the term "subdivision. "91 Previously, in order to trigger Act 
250 jurisdiction, a subdivider would have needed to subdivide any 
tract or tracts of land within a radius of five miles into ten or more 
10ts.92 The 1987 amendments expanded the radius of five miles to 
the area of a district commission. 93 Therefore, when determining 
whether a particular subdivision falls under state jurisdiction, the 
Environmental Board now counts all the lots that the subdivider has 
created within the district commission where the subdivision is lo-
cated: an area averaging 1,374 square miles. 94 
B5 1969 Vt. Laws 250, § 2(9). 
86 Id. § 2(6). 
87 Duncan, supra note 32, at 436; Susan Hamilton & Susan Clark, Parcellizing Vermont, 
VT. ENVTL. REP. 10, 11 (1986). 
88 See Kaplan, supra note 74, at 501. 
89 1984 Vt. Laws 114, § 1. 
00 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 1. The legislature found that Vermont was experiencing a fresh 
increase in subdivision activity, and acted to "ensure appropriate Act 250 review." Id. The 
1987 amendment also redefined "person" and created the Act 250 Disclosure Form. Id. § 2; 
see infra notes 128--50 and accompanying text. In addition, the amendment revised the land 
gains tax to step up enforcement and discourage land speCUlation. 1987 Vt. Laws 64, §§ 6-13; 
see supra note 51. 
91 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 2. 
92 1969 Vt. Laws 250, § 2(3). 
93 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 2. 
"Subdivision" means a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, which 
the person has partitioned or divided for the purpose of resale into 10 or more lots 
within a radius of five miles of any point on the lot, or within the same jurisdictional 
area of the same district commission, within any continuous period of five years. In 
determining the number of lots, a lot shall be counted if any portion is within five 
miles or within the jurisdictional area of the same district commission. 
Id. (emphasis added). To ease the impact on developers, the amendment also reduced the 
time that lots could accumulate from 10 years to five. Id. 
94 Id. Act 250 divides Vermont into seven districts. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(4) 
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The effect of this change on defining Act 250 jurisdiction was far-
reaching. It shifted the focus from the size of a proposed subdivision 
to the past subdivision activity of the subdivider within the particular 
district commission. 95 The determination of jurisdiction now requires 
inquiry into the previous subdivision activity of a subdivider to 
discern whether that subdivider is a "person" that "controlled" any 
lots previously subdivided within the district. 96 
A further extension of the definition of "subdivision" came with 
the passage of the Environmental Board rules,97 which since have 
gained the force of statute. 98 Rule 2(B) clarifies when a person has 
created a subdivision that requires a permit. 99 The rule requires a 
permit as soon as the person either sells the first lot of a subdivision 
with the intention of selling a total of ten lots, files a plat plan with 
ten lots recorded, or offers to sell a tenth lot in the same district 
within a five-year period. 1OO In enforcing Rule 2(B), the Board has 
gone beyond the specific indications of intent to subdivide listed in 
the rule. 101 For example, when a state employee, using another 
name, phoned a subdivider to ask if any lots were for sale, and the 
subdivider replied, "not yet," the Board held the reply to be a 
sufficient indication of an intent to subdivide. 102 On the other hand, 
the Board was unwilling to rule that a landowner intended to develop 
the second phase of a subdivision even though the landowner had 
made ambiguous statements about future subdivision while present-
ing the first phase to a planning commission, and only a short time 
had elapsed between the announcement to subdivide the second 
(Supp. 1991). The total area of Vermont is 9617 square miles. THE WORLD ALMANAC 641 
(Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1991). That total divided by seven equals 1374 square miles per district 
commission. 
96 See infra notes 301-31 and accompanying text. 
96 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). 
97 Vt. Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(B) (1990). 
98 In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 334, 566 A.2d 959, 962-63 (1989). 
99 Vt. Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(B) (1990). 
100 Id. Herein lies a jurisdictional peculiarity of Act 250. If a person develops and conveys 
nine lots, there is no review. If the same person then divides a different parcel into two lots 
within five years, the new two-lot subdivision falls under Act 250 review. The original sub-
division only falls under review if still unconveyed. Adler interview, supra note 70; see also 
In re Black Willow Farm, Declaratory Ruling No. 202, at 5-10 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1988) (first 
phase of project does not come under review retroactively after announcement of second phase 
if first phase did not require review on its own, and second phase was not planned at the time 
of first phase). Once conveyed, a lot no longer is "owned or controlled" by the subdivider. In 
re Shelburne Farms, Declaratory Ruling No. 310, at 3 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1989). 
101 In re Whiteham, Executive Officer Opinion No. 88-106, at 6 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Apr. 20, 
1989). 
102 Id. 
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phase and approval for the first phase. 103 Therefore, the first phase 
escaped state review. 104 
The definition of "subdivision" is most likely to create uncertainty 
when the determination of state jurisdiction rests on whether a 
particular subdivider "owns or controls" the tracts of land to be 
subdivided.105 By using the word "or," the Vermont legislature in-
tended that lots were to count against a developer who controlled 
land without actually owning it, thus eliminating a possible end run 
around the statute. 106 Exactly what "control" entails, however, has 
been hard to determine. 
The Vermont Supreme Court backed the Environmental Board's 
liberal definition of "control" when it examined a developer's obvious 
attempt to escape jurisdiction in In re Vitale. 107 The issue in that 
case was whether a developer crossed the one-acre threshold in Act 
250's definition of "development."108 The buyer of a 1.57-acre parcel 
refused to accept the deed for a .58-acre section of the parcel, taking 
only a .99-acre section but paying the purchase price for the entire 
1.57-acre parcel.109 The seller had no access to the .58-acre section, 
rendering it useless to him.110 Only after completion of construction 
on the first section did the seller convey the second. 111 The Board 
ruled that the two sections were the same parcel for the purposes 
of determining jurisdiction. 112 On appeal, the court treated "control" 
as a question of fact, acknowledging the possibility of de facto control 
in addition to purely legal control. 113 
The Vermont Supreme Court also considered the definition of 
control over subdivisions in In re Eastland, Inc. ll4 Eastland, a de-
velopment company buying land, made the arrangements for the 
seller to subdivide the land and directed and paid for the necessary 
103 In re Black Willow Farm, Declaratory Ruling No. 202, at 9 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1988). 
104 Id. 
105 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). 
106 In re Eastland, Inc., 151 Vt. 497, 500, 562 A.2d 1043, 1045 (1989). 
107 In re Vitale, 151 Vt. 580, 563 A.2d 613 (1989). 
108 Id. at 591, 563 A.2d at 615. In a municipality without zoning laws, and for a project to 
be a "development" requiring Act 250 review, the project must involve more than one acre. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
109 Vitale, 151 Vt. at 590, 563 A.2d at 614. 
l1°·Id. at 592, 563 A.2d at 616. 
111 Id. at 590, 563 A.2d at 614. 
112 Id. 
118 Id. at 592, 563 A.2d at 616. The court noted that, "[fJor all practical purposes, [the 
developer] controlled the .58 acre lot, although legal title remained with the seller." Id. 
114 151 Vt. 497, 562 A.2d 1043 (1989). 
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survey before actually purchasing the land. 115 Eastland and the seller 
also signed a purchase and sale agreement before subdividing the 
land. 116 The court found that Eastland had a "restraining or direct-
ing" influence over the land.117 It held that the intent of Act 250 was 
to require review when a developer enjoys the fruits of a subdivision 
but tries to avoid review by not subdividing the land itself. lIS 
In subsequent decisions, the Board confirmed that, when parties 
sign a purchase and sale agreement, the buyer receives certain rights 
to surveyor market the land. 119 The land need not be conveyed in 
order for the buyer to attain control. 120 If the sale of the land will 
not go forward without the seller's agreement to subdivide, or if the 
buyer pays for and arranges for costs associated with subdivision, 
then the buyer has control for the purposes of Act 250. 121 
The Vermont Supreme Court recently examined the issue of con-
trol in a complex case involving numerous companies that the defen-
dant and his family members owned or partially owned. In Vermont 
Environmental Board v. Chickering,122 the court held that a person 
who dominates the activities of a corporation that is subdividing land 
controls the subdivision for the purposes of Act 250 jurisdiction. 123 
The court described this domination of a company as "functional 
control" and noted that, to have functional control, a person does 
not need to have any ownership interest. l24 The court emphasized, 
as it had in Eastland,125 that when an individual's aim is to avoid 
115 Id. at 499, 562 A.2d at 1043. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 501, 562 A.2d at 1045. Eastland, having signed the sales contract, also had 
equitable rights in the land. Id. 
118 Id. 
119 In re Mitchell, Declaratory Judgment No. 203, at 8 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1989). 
120 Id. 
121 In re Harvard Management Co., Executive Officer Opinion No. 89-193, at 4 (Vt. Envtl. 
Bd. July 24, 1990). 
122 Vermont Envtl. Bd. v. Chickering, _ Vt. _, 583 A.2d 607 (1990). 
123 Id. at _, 583 A.2d at 609. The case involved a total of 18 lots scattered across four 
tracts and 13 different corporations that owned or conveyed one or more of the lots. [d. The 
trial court found that the defendant had control of eight of the corporations. [d. The Vermont 
Supreme Court held that, by his activities, the defendant could have had functional control of 
the other five as well. Id. at _, 583 A.2d at 610-11. The trial court had gauged control by 
the percentage of the defendant's stock ownership instead of by the level of his involvement 
with the companies. [d. at _, 583 A.2d at 610, 612. 
124 [d. at _, 583 A.2d at 613. The defendant claimed that the lots in which he had only a 
50% interest would only count as 50% of a lot for the purposes of Act 250 jurisdiction. The 
trial court agreed. The Supreme Court firmly rejected that view as inconsistent with the 
statute. [d. at _, 583 A.2d at 610 n.3. 
125 151 Vt. 497, 501, 562 A.2d 1043, 1045 (1989). 
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the statute, the court will disregard legal fictions such as dummy 
corporations. 126 According to the court, the Environmental Board 
had proven that the defendant controlled the lots in question and 
needed a permit in order to subdivide the land. 127 
4. Act 250's Definition of "Person" 
Act 250 requires a person commencing development or subdividing 
land to get a permit.128 The definition of "person" is particularly 
important due to the Act's emphasis, in determining jurisdiction, on 
the actual subdivider. 129 The Act's original definition of "person" 
included not only individuals but also larger entities such as corpo-
rations. 130 Both the Board and the Vermont Supreme Court liberally 
interpreted this definition. 131 The court, for example, held that land 
held by a husband and wife and land owned by the husband alone 
were owned by the same person. 132 It assumed that tenants in the 
entirety have an independent interest in the land for the purposes 
of the Act. 133 The court also found each individual in a joint ownership 
to be a person for the purpose of determining Act 250 jurisdiction. 134 
To ensure appropriate Act 250 review of subdivisions, the Vermont 
legislature expanded the definition of "person" in its 1987 amend-
ments to the Act. 135 The new definition applies only to subdivisions, 
126 Chickering, _ Vt. at _, 583 A.2d at 612. "[AJ court will disregard the fiction of a 
corporation's separate identity whenever the concept is asserted in an endeavor to circumvent 
a statute and defeat legislative policy." Id. (quoting Brennan v. Saco Construction, Inc., 381 
A.2d 656, 662-63 (Me. 1978». 
127 Id. 
128 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6081 (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
129 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. 
130 1969 Vt. Laws 250, § 2(8). The original definition of the word "person" was "an individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, unincorporated organization, trust or any other legal or 
commercial entity, including a joint venture or affiliated ownership." Id. 
131 In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 335, 566 A.2d 959, 963-64 (1989) (court approved Board's 
construction of definition of "person"). 
132 Id. at 335, 566 A.2d at 964. Although In re Spencer was decided after the 1987 amend-
ment redefining "person," the subdivision took place before the amendment, making the old 
definition applicable. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the addition of 
family members to the new definition of "person" meant that they were not included under 
the original Act. Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. '''Spencer and wife' do not comprise a separate 'person' ... from 'Spencer and [an 
associate)' or Spencer, himself." Id. 
135 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 2. The amendment added the following language to the original 
definition: 
A. Person: ... 
iii. includes individuals and entities affiliated with each other for profit, consider-
ation, or any other beneficial interest derived from partition or division of land. 
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not other types of development. 136 Leaving the old definition intact, 
the legislature simply broadened its scope by emphasizing the sig-
nificance of a party's financial interest in the land at issue. 137 The 
amendment stated that a "person" includes individuals or entities 
affiliated with each other for profit, consideration, or any other 
beneficial interest they could derive from partitioning land. 138 The 
new definition also includes family members unless the family mem-
ber in question can show no financial interest in the subdivision. 139 
In order to increase enforcement of the Act in light of the new, 
broader definition of "person," the legislature created the Act 250 
Disclosure Form. 140 When it records a new subdivision, the seller or 
partitioner of the new subdivision also must record a copy of the 
iv. includes an individual's parents and children, natural and adoptive, and spouse, 
unless the individual establishes that he or she will get no profit or consideration, or 
acquire any other beneficial interest from the partition of land by the parent, child 
or spouse. 
Id. Section B lists those individuals or entities that are presumed not to be affiliated unless 
they have a financial interest in the subdivision. They include stockholders with less than a 
five-percent interest, agents such as realtors or attorneys, and lending institutions. Id. 
136 Id. Act 250 jurisdiction over "development," as opposed to "subdivisions," is not person-
based. When determining jurisdiction, the Environmental Board only considers development 
within five miles by the same developer, not development within an entire district commission. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). Therefore, there is no reason for an expansive 
definition of "person." See infra notes 301-31 and accompanying text. 
137 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 2. 
133 Id. 
139 Id. Overall, the new amendment is very similar to the court's interpretation of the old 
statute. In a memo explaining the amendment, the Board included examples of its application: 
Example: After July 1, 1987, Jane subdivided and sold four lots in Dover (District 
No.2). In 1988, Jane and a friend Jerry buy land in Guilford (also District No.2) 
and subdivide six lots. Jerry's name is on the title, but Jane has contributed part of 
the purchase price and will share the profit. The Guilford subdivision will require an 
Act 250 permit. Jane is affiliated with Jerry for profit in the subdivision, and any 
lots which she has created within the last five years within the same district (or 
within five miles) will be counted. 
Example: Nancy owns 25% of the stock of ABC corporation. ABC Corporation 
owns land in Randolph (District 3), which it subdivides into eight lots and sells after 
July 1, 1987. In 1988, Nancy purchases land in Bethel (also District 3), which she 
subdivides into five lots. Nancy's subdivision will require an Act 250 permit. Because 
she is a significant owner (5% or more of outstanding shares in ABC Corporation), 
she is considered to be affiliated with ABC Corporation. Therefore Act 250's subdi-
vision activities within the district will be attributable to her. 
Darby Bradley, Chairman, Environmental Board, Memorandum to Those Interested in Act 
250 Amendments 3 (July 2, 1987) (on file with the Environmental Board, Montpelier, Vt.) 
These examples demonstrate how passing title can lead to disputes. It is very difficult to 
know what other lots can be attributable to a given subdivider. Adler interview, supra note 
70. 
140 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 2. 
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Form in order to report all of its previous subdivision activity. 141 
The purpose of the Form is to catch subdividers who otherwise would 
escape Act 250 jurisdiction by trying to ensure that their accumu-
lation of subdivided lots went unreported. l42 Therefore, the Act 
currently requires the state to look at individuals who might benefit 
from a subdivision to determine if any of these beneficiaries had an 
interest in any other subdivisions in the previous five years. 143 
Applying the new definition of "person," one Environmental Board 
executive officer found that two individuals who were associated 
with the same real estate corporation at the time they negotiated a 
purchase and sale agreement, who signed the agreement together, 
and who both profited from the transaction were affiliated for profit 
and therefore constituted a person for the purposes of the Act. 144 
In another case, the Board found the definition of "person" a close 
question. In In re Mitchell,145 a subdivider provided a contractor 
with the right to negotiate with lot buyers for contracts to grade 
and build on the land. 146 In fact, three of the lots bore covenants 
stipulating that the contractor would build the lot's home. 147 The 
contractor even represented the subdivider in planning commission 
hearings. 148 The Board found that, although the contractor and land-
owner were affiliated for profit, they derived their profit from the 
construction, not the subdivision itself,149 and that the lots in ques-
tion therefore could not be attributed to the contractor. 150 The Mitch-
ell ruling thus may limit the Act's otherwise expansive definition of 
person. 
5. "Development" and the Road Rule 
The power of the Vermont Environmental Board to regulate "de-
velopment" further extends its power to regulate subdivisions. 151 
The statute empowers the Board to require permits for commercial 
or industrial developments that are owned or controlled by a person 
141 Id. § 3. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. § 2. 
144 In re Harvard Management Co., Executive Officer Opinion No. 89-193, at 3 (Vt. Envtl. 
Bd. July 24, 1990). 
146 In re Mitchell, Declaratory Judgment No. 203 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1989). 
146 Id. at 8. 
147 Id. at 3. 
148 Id. at 2-5. 
149 Id. at 8. 
150 Id. 
161 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
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and involve more than ten acres of land within a radius of five miles 
on any point of involved land within a continuous period of five 
years. 152 In towns without zoning laws, as well as in towns that have 
zoning by-laws and would prefer a one-acre threshold over a ten-
acre threshold, the threshold for state jurisdiction over develop-
ments is one acre. 153 
The Board, using Act 250's definition of "development,"I54 has 
increased its jurisdiction over subdivisions significantly through one 
of its rules. 155 Rule 2(A)(6), the so-called "Road Rule," extends Act 
250 jurisdiction over any road either 800 feet long or providing access 
to more than five parcels, as long as the land involved meets the 
required size thresholds for a development. 156 The construction also 
must be "incidental to the sale or lease of land. "157 By requiring a 
permit for such a road, which is common in smaller subdivisions, the 
Board effectively exerts control over a large category of subdivisions 
otherwise uncovered under Act 250. 158 
The Vermont Supreme Court turned aside challenges to the Road 
Rule in In re Spencer, in which the court gave the Board Rules the 
152 Id. "'Development' means the construction of improvements on a tract or tracts of land, 
owned or controlled by a person, involving more than 10 acres of land within a radius of five 
or more miles of any point on any involved land, for commercial or industrial purposes." Id. 
The definition extends Act 250 jurisdiction to anything built above 2,500 feet in elevation, 
including subdivisions. Id. It also regulates condominiums and housing projects of more than 
10 units that meet the acreage requirements. I d. 
153 Id. The lower threshold for towns without zoning laws is in keeping with the purpose 
of state land use agencies to regulate those municipalities that cannot or will not do so on 
their own. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Towns with zoning laws may opt to 
require state review at the lower thresholds. Id. 
154 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
155 See In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 334, 566 A.2d 959, 962 (1989). 
156 vt. Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(A)(6) (1982). A "development" triggering Act 250 jurisdiction 
includes 
Id. 
[t]he construction of improvements for a road or roads, incidental to the sale or lease 
of land, to provide access to or within a tract of land of more than [one or ten acres, 
depending on whether the municipality has both permanent zoning and subdivision 
by-laws,] o\\-'lled or controlled by a person .... For the purpose of determining 
jurisdiction, any parcel of land which will be provided access by the road is land 
involved in the construction of the road. The jurisdiction shall not apply unless the 
road is to provide access to more than five parcels or is to be more than 800 feet in 
length. For the purpose of determining the length of a road, the length of all other 
roads within the tract of land constructed within any continuous period of ten years 
. . . shall be included. 
157 Id. This clause satisfies the "commercial purpose" requirement in the definition of 
"development." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3); cf. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 
742 (Me. 1973). 
158 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). 
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strength of statute. 159 The Board has applied the rule when a sub-
divider adds a length of road as short as 210 feet to an existing piece 
of road of 775 feet, putting it over the 800-foot limit.160 The Board 
has not been willing, however, to extend Act 250 jurisdiction over a 
driveway serving a single dwelling at the end of a road. 161 
The Board has been liberal in its interpretation of the rule's phrase 
"incidental to the sale ofland. "162 It has held that, if a farmer builds 
a road, the road is not a development requiring a permit unless the 
farmer planned to sell or subdivide the land. 163 The Board also has 
held, however, that a landowner who built a road was subject to the 
Act on the grounds that the landowner "mused" that he would like 
to build a trailer park at some time in the future, and had taken a 
few concrete steps toward construction. 164 
B. Maine's Site Location of Development Act 
The Maine legislature passed the Site Location of Development 
Act165 in 1970 in response to many of the same pressures that inspired 
Vermont's Act 250. Interstate highways and the growing national 
interest in outdoor sports brought a surge of recreational develop-
ment north to Maine. 166 These factors, combined with the increasing 
industrial development of the Maine coast motivated the state to 
assume a role in land use planning. 167 Concerned with the threat that 
uncontrolled growth posed to Maine's natural beauty, and the in-
ability of many municipalities to provide sophisticated review, the 
state legislature passed the Site Location Act to protect Maine cit-
izens from environmental harm that could be caused by the improper 
siting of large developments. 168 
169 152 Vt. 330, 334, 566 A.2d 959, 962; see supra note 70. 
160 In re Loomis Highlands, Executive Officer Opinion No. 88-140, at 3 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 
Sept. 28, 1989). 
161 In re Petrie, Declaratory Ruling No. 130, at 2 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1981). 
162 See In re Goldsmith, Envtl. Bd. Order No. 341, at 3 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Oct. 8, 1987). 
163 Id. 
164 In re Ciampi, Executive Officer Opinion No. 89-188, at 3 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Feb. 13, 1990). 
166 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-490 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). 
166 See Alison Rieser, Managing the Cumulative Effects of Coastal Land Development: 
Can Maine Law Meet the Challenge, 39 ME. L. REV. 321, 335 (1987). 
167 Id. 
163 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 (West 1989). The most compelling reason for state 
review of development is the technical inability of Maine's rural towns to handle the increas-
ingly complex nature of environmental review. Interview with Jeff Madore, Department of 
Environmental Protection, in Augusta, Me. (Nov. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Madore interview]. 
1991] STATE SUBDIVISION REGULATION 405 
1. The Site Location Act's Review Process 
The Act empowers a Board of Environmental Protection (BEP), 
operating within the state Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP), to require any development, including subdivisions, of a 
certain size to undergo review. 169 A developer that is uncertain about 
whether its development falls under the BEP's jurisdiction may 
write for an advisory opinion. 170 If jurisdiction applies, then the BEP 
must deny, permit, or conditionally permit the developer's project. l7l 
The BEP bases its decision on specified criteria, which it has a 
good deal of discretion when applying.172 Unlike Vermont, there are 
no intermediary decisionmakers such as the district commissions. 173 
169 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 483-A (West Supp. 1990). The Site Location Act is not 
the only type of subdivision regulation that Maine imposes. The state's Protection of Natural 
Resources Act requires a BEP permit for the construction of any structure in certain envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas. Id. §§ 480A-480S (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). These sensitive 
areas include rivers, streams, great ponds, fragile mountain areas, freshwater wetlands, 
significant wildlife habitats, and coastal sand dunes. Id. § 480A. The statute's sensitive areas 
are very similar to the Model Code's "areas of critical concern." MODEL CODE, supra note 33, 
§ 7-201. 
The Legislature also has exerted state control over land use in Maine's huge area of 
unorganized territories. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 683-685B (West 1981 & Supp. 1990). 
It created the Land Use Regulatory Commission to define minimum land use standards and 
directly regulate most development within the unorganized territories. Id. §§ 683, 685-B. The 
Commission's jurisdiction includes subdivisions of three or more lots of less than 40 acres 
each. Id. § 682(2). Lots of over 40 acres that are not in the shoreline zone are exempted. Id. 
So-called "spaghetti lots," those which have a shoreline-to-depth ratio greater than five to 
one, are banned. Id. § 682(13), 682A. 
The state requires local control over subdivisions of three lots or more in addition to state 
review of larger subdivisions under the Site Location Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, 
§§ 4401-4407 (West Supp. 1990). The state-mandated criteria for local planning boards are 
very similar to the criteria for DEP under the Site Location Act. Id. § 4404. Like the Land 
Use Act, 40-acre lots are exempted, and there is a ban on "spaghetti lots." Id. § 4401(4), (17). 
170 Code Me. R. § 203262 (1991). 
171 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 485-A(1) (West Supp. 1990). The Board has the option 
of convening a hearing before making a decision. Id. The Board has delegated decisions on 
applications of less than 75 acres and fewer than 25 lots to the Commissioner of Environmental 
Protection and the DEP staff. See Tybe A. Brett, General Discretion Under Maine's Site 
Location of Development Law, 41 ME. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989). 
172 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 484 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). These criteria include 
the financial capacity of the developer, as well as the development's effect on traffic movement, 
the environment, erosion, groundwater, flooding, open space, and infrastructure such as 
sewage and roads. Id. The criterion requiring BEP to consider the development's effect on 
the environment is expansive. The developer must make "adequate provision for fitting the 
development harmoniously into the existing natural environment and [ensure] that the de-
velopment will not adversely affect existing uses, scenic character, air quality, water quality, 
and other natural resources .... " Id. See generally, Brett, supra note 171, at 10. 
173 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6026 (1984 & Supp. 1991); see supra notes 51-55 and accom-
panying text. 
406 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:385 
The Site Location Act, however, does transfer the state's powers of 
review to any municipality that shows the competence to do a site 
review. 174 
2. Jurisdiction Under the Site Location Act 
Jurisdiction under the Site Location Act is concretely defined. The 
legislature sought to control any development that, by virtue of its 
size or nature, would have a great impact on the environment. 175 
Originally, the Act did not include residential subdivisions. 176 The 
Maine Supreme Court, however, ruled that the original definition of 
development included residential subdivisions created for commer-
cial goals, whether a developer intended to build or merely to sub-
divide its property.l77 The legislature eventually explicitly included 
subdivisions meeting specific size thresholds in the Act's definition 
of "development."178 
The Site Location Act now extends the BEP's jurisdiction to any 
subdivision, on any parcel of twenty or more acres, that a person 
splits up into five or more lots over a period of five years. 179 Unlike 
Vermont, jurisdiction centers only on the particular piece of land at 
issue, not the person subdividing. The BEP does not consider any 
other land the person has subdivided when totaling subdivided land 
for jurisdictional purposes. 180 
Although the twenty-acre threshold has made jurisdiction in Maine 
simpler to determine than jurisdiction in Vermont, 181 it has presented 
174 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 489-A (West Supp. 1990). The BEP still reserves review 
of subdivisions of over 100 acres. The municipality must enact standards at least as stringent 
as the Site Location Act and have a professional staff. Id. 
176 I d. § 481. 
176 1969 Me. Laws 571; see also In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 742-43 (Me. 1973). 
For a history of Maine's different statutory definitions for "development" and "subdivision," 
see J. Jackson Walter, The Law of the Land: Development Legislation in Maine and Vermont, 
23 ME. L. REV. 315, 335 n.80 (1971). 
177 Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 742-43; see also In re Belgrade Shores, Inc., 371 A.2d 
413,414-15 (Me. 1977) (state jurisdiction extends to land merely subdivided with no intention 
to develop). 
178 1971 Me. Laws 613, §§ 2, 3. 
179 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(2)(G), (5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). The definition 
of "subdivision" does not include apartment and condominium complexes, but the state may 
regulate such complexes if they are built in a shoreland zone, or if they are large enough to 
be defined as a "structure." Id. § 482(2)(E), § 482(2)(H), § 482(2-D), § 482(6). Road construction 
only triggers Site Location Act jurisdiction when the road itself covers an area of three acres 
or more. Id. § 482(6)(B). 
180 See infra notes 301-31 and accompanying text. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 
§ 482(5) (West Supp. 1990) with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). 
181 Madore interview, supra note 168. 
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its own problems. The proliferation of 19- to 19.9-acre subdivisions 
has resulted in a lack of government review for numerous projects182 
that substantially may affect the state's environment and quality of 
life. IRa Moreover, many developers have escaped the Act's five-year 
requirement by retaining land in a given parcel but declaring that 
they have no intent to subdivide for five years. l84 When these de-
velopers do develop their land, only the land they actually subdivide 
is counted for the purposes of the twenty-acre threshold, not the 
land that they have retained. 185 Therefore, over fifteen years, a 
developer could subdivide three noncontiguous fifty-nine-acre farms 
in the same town into as many lots as possible without state review 
as long as the lots were not within the immediate vicinity of each 
other, and there was no common scheme of development. 186 
The Maine legislature experimented with several exceptions to 
the Site Location Act. 187 Until 1989, the Act provided exceptions for 
large lot subdivisions. 188 It exempted from review those subdivisions 
in which all the lots each were at least ten acres in size. 189 It also 
182 See In re Keene Woods Subdivision, Advisory Opinion at 1 (Me. Dep't Envtl. Protection 
Nov. 2, 1990) (developer escaped review of 24-acre development by buying back a six-acre 
parcel from Homeowners Association); In re L.P. Guerin Estates, Advisory Opinion at 1 (Me. 
Dept. Envtl. Protection June 19, 1990) (developer reduced one lot's acreage by 0.132 acres in 
order to bring total area of subdivision to 19.985 acres); see also Rieser, supra note 166, at 
338. 
183 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). 
184 The DEP only counts the acreage that the developer intends to develop over the next 
five years. Code Me. R. § 203246 (1991). In fact, the DEP pointed out to one potential 
subdivider, who was applying for a permit to subdivide part of its land, that "no reference to 
possible future development of retained land should be made. The Site Law can and has been 
applied to projects where an intent to further subdivide has been shown .... [DEP] suggest[s] 
you make no reference to further subdivision possibility." In re Whelan, Advisory Opinion at 
1 (Me. Dep't Envtl. Protection Mar. 30, 1990). 
For a brief period, the Act required that BEP consider the size of the entire parcel when 
determining jurisdiction, not just the area to be subdivided. 1987 Me. Laws 812, § 7. The Site 
Law was amended to return to the original method of arriving at the 20 acres. 1989 Me. Laws 
497. 
185 ME. REV, STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990). 
186 See id. Every five years, retaining the rest of each tract, the subdivider could divide 19 
acres on each farm every five years. See id. 
187 Id. There are minor exceptions as well. Lots sold to family members or abutting 
landowners, lots given as gifts or conservation easements, and lots given as security interests 
do not count. Id. Also, the Site Location Act does not apply to the unorganized territories 
regulated by the Land Use Regulatory Commission. Id. § 488(1). The Legislature also has 
exempted low-density subdivisions where the subdivider voluntarily accepts strict environ-
mental measures to permanently protect land. Id. § 488(5)(B). 
188 1975 Me. Laws 712. The legislative history of the five- and 10-acre exemptions is 
convoluted. See 1987 Me. Laws 737, § C; 1987 Me. Laws 812, § 7. 
189 1975 Me. Laws 712. 
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exempted subdivisions where all the lots were at least five acres in 
size, and the subdivision encompassed less than 100 total acres, 
depending on whether the municipality had passed subdivision reg-
ulations. l90 
Like Vermont,191 Maine had created these exceptions with the 
belief that larger lot subdivisions were less likely to cause environ-
mental harm. 192 In Maine, there was no problem with "spaghetti 
lots," because the ten-acre exception required that lots be able to 
hold a rectangle of 200 feet by 300 feet. 193 The state's problems 
instead resulted from speculation in lots, as there was nothing in the 
Site Location Act to prevent a purchaser of exempt five-acre lots 
from turning around and subdividing each of those lots into four 
additional lots without state review. The end result would have been 
the same as if the original developer had subdivided the parcel into 
numerous lots. 194 To halt this abuse, the legislature repealed the five-
and ten-acre exceptions. 195 A modified exception for forty-acre lots 
outside shoreland zones and an absolute exception for lots greater 
than 500 acres survive. l96 
By considering the land, and not the person subdividing land, the 
Site Location Act has not required the complex analyses of "person" 
and "control"197 that are necessary under Vermont's Act 250. 198 When 
the parcel is the focus of the law, it does not matter who "controls" 
the parcel. l99 If land meets the statutory requirements, it undergoes 
review, no matter who owns it or no matter what other land its 
owner may have subdivided. 200 
190 Id. 
191 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
192 Drive to Close Land Use Loophole Faces Fierce Fight, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, 
Apr. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Land Use Loophole]. 
193 1975 Me. Laws 712. 
194 Madore interview, supra note 168. This practice also occurs in Vermont and is known 
as "pyramiding." See Hamilton & Clark, supra note 87, at 12. 
195 1989 Me. Laws 769, §§ 2-4. 
196 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5)(C)-(C-l) (West Supp. 1990). The shoreland zone 
exception was a recent compromise between environmentalists who wanted the 40-acre ex-
ception removed to end speculation and wood lot owners who wanted to be able to exchange 
land quickly. Land Use Loophole, supra note 192, at 1, col. 3. 
197 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). The Site Location 
Act defines "person" as "any person, firm, association, partnership, corporation, municipal or 
other local government entity, quasi-municipal entity, state agency, educational or charitable 
organization or institution or any other legal entity." Id. Maine has no definition of "control." 
198 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(4), (19) (Supp. 1991); see supm notes 105-50 and 
accompanying text. 
199 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990). 
200 See id. 
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Furthermore, the Act provides jurisdiction over a single parcel 
even if control of the parcel is divided among several people. 201 
Parcels that are part of a "common scheme of development" may be 
treated as a single parcel. 202 Elements of a common scheme include 
common ownership, management, equipment, or financing. 203 The 
lots under construction also must be in the immediate vicinity of 
each other to be considered part of the same subdivision. 204 The 
parcels, however, need not be contiguous.205 If they are divided by 
an artificial barrier such as a railroad or highway, the determination 
of whether they are one subdivision for the purposes of the Act's 
jurisdiction is an issue of fact the resolution of which depends on 
whether the parcels are part of a common scheme of development. 206 
C. Florida and the Model Code 
One result of the interest in statewide land use regulation in the 
1970s was the American Law Institute's Model Land Development 
Code.207 The Model Code was designed to update the Standard Zon-
201 Id.; see also In re Burnt Meadow Rd., Advisory Opinion at 3 (Me. Dep't Envtl. Protection 
Apr. 13, 1990) (parcel of land to be subdivided required review even though different sections 
were owned by different people). 
202 Code Me. R. § 203241 (1991). 
203 Id. 
"Common scheme of development" means a plan or process of development which: 
1. Takes place on contiguous or non-contiguous parcels or lots in the same imme-
diate vicinity; and 
2. Exhibits characteristics of a unified approach, method or effect such as: 
a. unified ownership, management or supervision; 
b. sharing of common equipment or labor; or 
c. common financing. 
Id.; see also Burnt Meadow Rd., Advisory Opinion at 3 (common scheme found when different 
owners of nearby plots built road together and prepared common site plans). 
204 Code Me. R. § 203241 (1991). The common scheme inquiry does create an expanded 
definition of "person" in that the different owners of each parcel may be treated as one person 
subdividing land. See, e.g., In re Little River Farms Subdivision, Advisory Opinion at 1 (Me. 
Dep't Envtl. Protection May 24, 1990). However, because the lands to be combined must be 
in the immediate vicinity of each other, the focus of jurisdiction determination remains on the 
land and not the person. See Code Me. R. § 203241 (1991). 
206 See In re Gregor-Mouse Subdivision, Advisory Opinion at 1 (Me. Dep't Envtl. Protection 
Mar. 19, 1990) (strip of railroad-owned land sufficient to divide land into two parcels). 
206 Board of Envtl. Protection v. Bergeron, 434 A.2d 25, 27 (Me. 1981) (whether two 
sections of land divided by public road are same parcel is determined by level of integration 
between two sections). 
207 MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at 1. The 12-year process of drafting the Code "coincided 
with a period of history of American land law notable for the changes which have taken 
place .... " Fred S. Bosselman, Some Observations on the American Law Institute's Model 
Land Development Code, 8 URB. L. 474, 474 (1976). 
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ing and Planning Enabling Act,208 which many states had adopted in 
order to grant localities control over land development.209 The Model 
Code, while maintaining local government as the primary arbiter of 
local land use issues, also created a role for the states. 210 The drafters 
of the Code envisioned a state-supervised approval process for any 
development with the potential to have impacts beyond the partic-
ular locality that otherwise would have regulatory responsibility for 
the development.211 Exercising power through a state adjudicatory 
board, the state would review any development within "area[s] of 
critical state concern"212 or "development of regional impact" 
(DRI).213 To enable a state agency to define a DRI, the Code pro-
posed a set of criteria. 214 State regulation of subdivisions under the 
Model Code would occur when a subdivision fit the definition of a 
DRI. 
Florida is the only state to adopt substantially all the provisions 
of the Model Code. 215 Florida's need for the state regulation of de-
velopment is perhaps greater than any other state in the nation.216 
It is one of the nation's more fragile ecosystems.217 Moreover, in this 
208 MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at 1 (commentary to art. 1). 
209 Id. at 248 (commentary to art. 7). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. § 7-303. 
212 Id. § 7-201. 
218 Id. § 7-301. 
214 Id. § 7-301. The Code suggests that the criteria include the size of the development as 
well as its impact on the environment, transportation, population, subsidiary development, 
and the integrity of any unique qualities in the local area. For further explanation, see id. at 
271 (text and notes to art. 7). 
215 5 ROHAN supra note 7, § 33.03[5][a] n.318. Florida adopted many of the Code's concepts, 
such as "areas of critical concern," DRIs, and local review governed by a state agency. HEALY 
& ROSENBERG supra note 1, at 134. 
States that have adopted modified versions of the Code's idea of "areas of critical concern" 
include Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, and Wyoming. See 
DeGrove, supra note 41, at 57-58. Two regional planning commissions in Massachusetts also 
are based on the Model Code in that they both contain the "area of critical concern" and the 
"development of regional impact" (DRI) components. The Martha's Vineyard Commission has 
the power to review and permit DR Is and any development in areas of critical concern. 1974 
Mass. Acts 637. The Commission sets the criteria for DRIs. 1977 Mass. Acts 831, § 12. Local 
planning boards or officials then determine whether a development is a DR!. Id. § 13; see also 
Morey v. Martha's Vineyard Comm'n, 409 Mass. 813, 817-20, 569 N.E.2d 826,829-31 (1991) 
(Commission procedure allowing other municipalities besides local permitting authority to 
refer projects to Commission as DRIs was ultra vires). The small size of the Commission's 
geographical jurisdiction lessens the impact of jurisdictional issues. 5 WILLIAMS, supra note 
25, § 160.39, at 745 n.49. The newly formed Cape Cod Commission is similar to the Martha's 
Vineyard Commission. 1989 Mass. Laws 716. 
216 DeGrove, supra note 41, at 52-53. 
217 Thomas G. Pelham, Regulating Developments of Regional Impact: Florida and the 
Model Code, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 789, 792-93 (1977). 
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century, the state has been the site of one of the nation's most 
massive population and development explosions. 218 In response, the 
state embraced the Model Code through the passage of the Envi-
ronmental Land and Water Management Act (ELWMA) in 1972.219 
The Florida statute, unlike those in Maine and Vermont, does not 
provide for direct state permitting of land subdivision.220 The state, 
however, does distinguish between larger developments that have a 
regional impact and must go through a state-mandated review pro-
cess, and those developments that are small enough to require only 
local review. 221 Even though the regulation of subdivision is not 
central to Florida's land use policy, the state's Act presents juris-
dictional questions similar to those that Maine and Vermont face 
when regulating subdivisions. 
1. The ELWMA Permitting Process 
In Florida, there are three major parties in the permit process for 
a DRI:222 the local government,223 the regional planning commis-
sion,224 and the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), which 
serves as the state land planning agency.225 A developer wishing to 
build a project that is a DRI must take part in a preapplication 
conference with the regional planning commission; this conference 
serves to streamline the review process. 226 The developer then sub-
218 DeGrove, supra note 41, at 52-53; Pelham, s'upra note 217, at 792-93. 
219 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
220 Id.; cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-490 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990), VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
221 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(1) (West 1988). The definition of "development" includes the 
subdivision of land into three or more parcels. Id. § 380.04(1). Therefore, a "development" of 
regional impact could include subdivisions. 
222 For an overview of the process, see generally Bruce D. Partington, Frith Revisited: 
Practice and Procedure Under Florida's Development of Regional Impact Statutes, 6 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 107 (1990); Claire B. Carraway, Note, Florida's DRI Statute: Alternatives 
to the Standard DRI Review, 13 STETSON L. REV. 619, 628.,36 (1984). 
223 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.031(11) (West 1988). Until 1985, at which point the state required 
zoning boards, a developer did not need to go through the DRI process if there was no local 
zoning board. 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-45, § 43. In 1985, the legislature passed the Local 
Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, which required 
local planning agencies to establish land development regulations. FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 163.3161-.3243 (West 1991); cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991) (state review 
is more stringent in municipality without zoning regulations). 
224 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.031(15) (West 1988). 
225 Id. § 380.032. 
226 Id. § 380.06(7). There are procedures through which a developer may go in order to 
allow it to commence development at its own risk before getting approval. Id. § 380.06(8) 
(West Supp. 1991). 
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mits its application for a permit to the local planning agency, the 
regional planning commission, and the DCA.227 The regional com-
mission studies the regional impact of the development and reports 
its findings to the local government.228 The local authority renders a 
decision approving or denying the application and, if necessary, at-
taching appropriate fees, conditions, and requirements. 229 
The state's role increases in the appeals process.230 Developers 
may appeal any decision by the local authority to the Administration 
Commission, which is comprised of the Governor and the Cabinet 
and acts as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission 
(FLWAC).231 Appeal may be made for almost any reason,232 but may 
only be made by the owner, developer, regional agency, or DCA.233 
Appealing a local decision before the FLWAC is the only way that 
the state planning agency may become involved directly with the 
approval of a DR!. 234 
The state can cede some of its authority over DRI review in two 
ways. ELWMA allows the certification of local governments to carry 
out DRI review in lieu of the regional system.235 Furthermore, it 
allows developers to apply for areawide DRI approval. 236 Once the 
DCA approves an area plan, a developer may carry out development 
according to that plan without further review. 237 
227 Id. § 380.06(10)(a) (West 1988). 
228 Id. § 380.06(12). Criteria for determining a development's regional impact include its 
potential impact on the environment, natural and historical resources, economy, water and 
sewer services, and transportation. Id. 
229 Id. § 380.06(14}-.06(15) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Local governments must consider a 
development's consistency with the state development plan, the local comprehensive plan and 
local regulations, and the regional planning agency's report. Id. 
230 Id. § 380.07 (West 1988). The state has no input into the local government's initial 
decision. Id. § 380.06(12). 
231 Id. § 380.07(1); Carraway, supra note 222, at 634-36. 
232 THOMAS G. PELHAM, STATE LAND USE PLANNING AND REGULATION 30 (1979) quoted 
in Carraway, supm note 222, at 634. 
233 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.07(2) (West 1988); see also Friends of Everglades, Inc. v. Board 
of County Comm'rs of Monroe County, 456 So. 2d 904, 909 reh'g denied 462 So. 2d n08 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (environmental groups denied standing to appeal a local decision to 
the FLWAC); Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 
429 So. 2d 1260, 1263, reh'g denied 438 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (neighboring 
property owners denied standing to appeal a local decision to FLWAC). 
234 Because the DCA does not enter the local review process, the only way in which it can 
stop a DRI is by appeal to the FLWAC. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.07 (West 1988). 
235 Id. § 380.065. 
236 Id. § 380.06(25) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
237 Id. 
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2. ELWMA's Jurisdiction over Land Use: Defining "Development 
of Regional Impact" 
The state does playa direct role in determining the ELWMA's 
jurisdiction.238 If in doubt regarding its project's status, a developer 
may apply directly to the DCA for a letter determining whether its 
particular development is a DR!. 239 The DCA letter is binding on all 
parties. 240 The decision to issue a binding letter is at the sole discre-
tion of the DCA.241 No other party, including the regional commis-
sion, has standing to appeal a binding letter.242 The DCA must 
consider only the size thresholds that the Administration Commis-
sion has established to define a DR!. 243 Developers that commence 
construction without such a letter do so at the risk of later being 
denied a permit. 244 
ELWMA's goal is to assure proper consideration of the effects 
that any development may have outside the jurisdiction of the local 
authority.245 When reviewing developments to determine whether 
they would have a regional impact and thus need permits, the DCA 
initially needed a clear standard so that it would not simply judge, 
on a case-by-case basis, those projects likely to have an impact 
beyond a county's borders. 246 The legislature thus empowered the 
Administration Commission to set numerical thresholds to aid the 
DCA.247 These thresholds represent the sizes at which different 
types of projects are presumed to have a regional impact.248 Because 
the regional impact of a development may have causes that these 
thresholds do not consider, however, the thresholds are presumptive 
238 [d. § 380.06(4) (West 1988). 
239 [d. The DCA or local authority can require a developer to apply for a binding letter if 
the development exceeds certain numerical thresholds. [d. § 380.06(4)(b)(I). Authorities in a 
locality adjacent to the development also may request a binding letter. [d. § 380.06(4)(b)(2)(c). 
240 See Carraway, supra note 222, at 627. 
241 [d. 
242 [d. Regional planning agencies cannot appeal. South Florida Regional Planning Council 
v. Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 372 So. 2d 159, 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1979). Neighboring property owners also are denied the right to appeal. Suwannee River 
Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. State Dep't of Community Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1374 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
243 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(4)(b) (West 1988). 
244 [d. 
246 [d. § 380.06(1). 
246 Pelham, supra note 218, at 798. 
247 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(2)(a) (West 1988). 
248 [d. 
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rather than conclusive.249 Therefore, the DCA must contemplate 
other factors when determining whether a project is a reviewable 
DR!.250 
Because of the presumptive nature of the thresholds and the quan-
tity of information that the DCA needed to make a determination of 
whether a project was a DRI requiring review, the pre-DRI review 
process began to resemble the review process itself.251 In a 1985 
amendment to the ELWMA, the legislature attempted to render the 
pre-review process less flexible while preventing size from becoming 
the sole determinant of whether a development required review 
under the Act.252 Through the 1985 amendment, the legislature cre-
ated what it called a "band of presumption. "253 Now, any develop-
ment sized from eighty percent to 100% of the mandated threshold 
is presumed not to be a DRI,254 and any development sized from 
100% to 120% of the mandated threshold is presumed to be a DR!. 255 
A development sized above 120% of the threshold is by law a DRI,256 
and one sized below eighty percent of the threshold is by law not a 
DR!. 257 Consequently, where a project is sized between eighty per-
cent and 120% of the thresholds designated for that type of project, 
the DCA has the discretion to consider other factors in determining 
whether ELWMA has jurisdiction.258 
ELWMA provides other types of jurisdictional flexibility besides 
the "band of presumption." For example, different types of de vel-
249 Id. 
260 In General Dev. Corp. v. Division of State Planning, the Florida First District Court 
of Appeals emphasized the presumptive nature of the guidelines, finding that they do not 
"reduce the Division's responsibility under 380.06(4) [the binding letter provision] to a me-
chanical chore of counting dwelling units or making other quantitative calculations. The 
presumption afforded by the Rule is to be respected, but the Division still must decide; and 
in decision the Rule must not ... swallow the statute .... " 353 So. 2d 1199, 1208-09 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also Suwannee River Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. State 
Dep't of Community Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1374 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1980) (DCA carried 
out "careful and detailed examination of the character, magnitude and location or the devel-
opment ... " although development was not presumptively DR!). 
251 Thomas G. Pelham, et aI., Managing Florida's Growth: Toward an Integrated State, 
Regional, and Local Comprehensive Planning Process, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 517, 562 
(1985). 
252 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-45, § 46. 
2Ii3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(2)(d) (West 1988). 
264 Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(2)(a). 
255 Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(2)(b). 
266 Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(I)(b). 
257 Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(I)(a). 
268 For developments falling within the "band of presumption," the 1985 amendment as-
sumes that the DCA needs to consider all the factors previously required for a determination 
of a DR!. See General Dev. Corp. v. Division of State Planning, 353 So. 2d 1199, 1208-09 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
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opment require the application of different criteria for the determi-
nation of whether they are DR Is. 259 The criteria reflect whether the 
impact of a given type of project will be regional. 260 For example, 
residential development thresholds are based on the number of living 
units to be built, petroleum tank thresholds are based on the number 
of barrels the tank will hold, and performance facility thresholds are 
based on the number of seats therein. 261 
ELWMA also offers flexibility through its provision of staggered 
thresholds for residential developments, including subdivisions. 262 
The thresholds that DCA uses to determine whether residential 
developments are DRIs are staggered according to the population 
of the county where the development is located. 263 It is not merely 
the size of the project that determines impact, but also its location. 264 
A large development may have less impact in an urban area than it 
would in a rural area. 265 ELWMA provides further jurisdictional 
flexibility by authorizing local governments, regional commissions, 
and the DCA to petition for a change in the thresholds for a partic-
ular jurisdiction.266 These three entities can make such a petition 
provided that the local government has shown both sufficient capa-
bility for review and good cause for the change. 267 
3. Aggregation 
Because ELWMA is based upon thresholds that do not trigger 
jurisdiction until a residential development contains as many as 3000 
269 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. IT. 28-24.001 to 28-24.032 (1989). Types of development 
specified include airports. tourist attractions, recreational facilities, electrical power stations 
and transmission lines, hospitals, industrial plants, mining operations, office parks, petroleum 
facilities, port facilities, residential development, schools, retail, service and wholesale devel-
opments, hotels and motels, recreational vehicle parks, and multi-use developments. Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at IT. 28-24.010, 28-24.012, 28-24.021. 
262 Id. at r. 28-24.010. The Code defines residential development as including, but not 
limited to: "(a) the subdivision of any land attributable to common ownership into parcels, 
lots, units or interests, or (b) land or dwelling units which are part of a common plan of rental 
advertising or sale, or (c) the construction of residential structures, or (d) the establishment 
of mobile home parks." Id. A "dwelling unit" includes any family Jiving space such as an 
apartment unit or a single house. Id. 
263 Id. at r. 28-24.010. The thresholds vary by county depending on the county's population. 
For example, if a county's population is less than 25,000, then the DR! threshold is only 250 
dwelling units; if the county's population is over 500,001, then the DR! threshold is over 3000 
dwelling units. Id. 
264 See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, § 7-301(2)(f). 
266 Pelham, supra note 218, at 802-03 .. 
266 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(3) (West 1988). 
267 Id. § 38O.06(3)(a). 
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dwelling units,268 subdividers easily can duck under the DRI thresh-
old for a particular project. This results in a good deal of unreviewed 
development. 269 Furthermore, with the determination of jurisdiction 
based on land and defined by high thresholds, it is possible for a 
developer to compile numerous projects, each under a given DRI 
threshold, and label each one a different development in order to 
avoid DRI review. In General Development Corp. v. Division of 
State Planning, Department of Administration,270 Florida's First 
District Court of Appeals addressed a case in which a developer 
labelled two projects as different developments. 271 The court held 
that the DCA was not bound to accept the developer's definition of 
his development. According to the court, the DCA had the power 
to consider other lands the developer owned as long as they were 
part of a common plan for rental advertising or sale. 272 
In 1986, the legislature addressed this loophole by granting the 
DCA power to aggregate separate developments using strict stan-
dards. 273 It established four factors as prerequisites for combining 
two projects: evidence of common ownership; a master plan; volun-
tarily shared infrastructure; and physical proximity of the two de-
velopments to be aggregated. 274 Developers subsequently could 
avoid aggregation of two developments by ensuring that there was 
no shared infrastructure or master plan, or that the projects were 
not too close together. 275 
A 1988 amendment slightly liberalized these aggregation rules. 276 
In keeping with the idea of land-based jurisdiction, ELWMA still 
requires the physical proximity of the developments and a well-
defined, unified plan of development. 277 In order to fit the description 
2GB See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
269 Pelham, supra note 218, at 803; see also HEALY & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 63. 
270 353 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
271 Id. at 1207-09. 
272 Id. at 1208. The court focused on the development, not the developer. See id. 
273 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-45, § 46. The actual standards were promulgated by the Admin-
istration Commission. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. IT. 28-11.001 to 28-11.003 (1988); Elizabeth 
C. Bowman & David L. Powell, The Flexible New Approach to DRI Aggregation, 63 FLA. B. 
J. 54, 54 (1989). 
274 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 28-11.003 (1988). 
275 Pelham, supra note 251, at 566. 
276 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-164, § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.0651(4) (West Supp. 
1991)). In White v. Metropolitan Dade County, the court used existing contracts between a 
developer and builders to bind two projects, a tennis stadium and a tennis complex, into one 
DR!. 563 So. 2d 117, 131 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Although the court applied the 
Administration Commission's 1986 rules, it described the 1988 amendment as further strength-
ening the DCA's ability to aggregate projects. Id. 
277 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.0651(4)(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
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of a unified scheme of development under the 1988 amendment, the 
parcels to be aggregated must have any two of the following five 
characteristics:278 the same person retains or shares control of the 
developments;279 there is a reasonable closeness in time between the 
eighty-percent completion of one part of the project and submission 
of the plans for the second part of the project;280 a master plan exists 
that includes all the developments;281 there is voluntary sharing of 
infrastructure between the developments;282 or there is a common 
advertising or promotional scheme linking the developments. 283 
These aggregation rules help temper the ability of a developer to 
exploit the high DRI thresholds and avoid review by accumulating 
several developments, each one just under the threshold, in one 
area. 
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING JURISDICTION OVER 
SUBDIVISIONS FOR STATE LAND USE AGENCIES 
State legislatures and state or regional planning agencies face 
certain decisions as they define the scope of their jurisdiction over 
subdivisions and other developments. Another level of regulation 
beyond local control is burdensome to the regulated industry. States, 
in keeping with traditional notions of land use regulation, typically 
leave some decisions to localities, assuming that localities more ef-
ficiently can make decisions that involve local issues. Drawing the 
line between local and state control requires policy decisions that 
must take into account the goals of the state's land policy, efficiency, 
and the nature of development in the state. 
Based on this Comment's review of state land use agency juris-
diction in Vermont, Maine, and Florida, three ingredients that would 
contribute to a workable concept of jurisdiction become evident. 
First, judicial deference to the state agency and restraint on the 
part of that agency are important factors for a workable definition 
of jurisdiction. Second, a land-based jurisdiction with certain safe-
guards seems superior to a person-based jurisdiction. Finally, a state 
agency needs rigid criteria defining its jurisdiction in order to enable 
both the state agency and developers or subdividers to determine 
278 See Bowman & Powell, supra note 273, at 54-57 (detailed description of five factors.) 
279 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.0651(4)(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
280 [d. 
281 [d. 
282 [d. 
283 [d. 
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quickly which projects require review. Moreover, the thresholds that 
the criteria define should be staggered to reflect the environmental 
sensitivity of different regions within the state. 
A. Judicial Scrutiny and Agency Restraint 
There are two factors that give a jurisdiction scheme a greater 
likelihood of success. First, courts must be willing to construct a 
state's land use control statute liberally enough to allow a state 
agency to enforce the law against those using legal fictions to avoid 
it.284 Otherwise, the agency would be forced to ask the state legis-
lature for more restrictive legislation in order properly to enforce 
the statute.285 Second, an agency should avoid destroying its credi-
bility by exploiting the long leash that the judiciary or legislature 
may have granted it. This problem arises when agencies pursue the 
farthest reaches of their jurisdiction and regulate development that 
the legislature did not intend to regulate. 
In Maine, Vermont, and Florida, the courts have been willing to 
interpret the jurisdictional provisions of each state's land use statute 
liberally. The Vermont Supreme Court has seen through subdividers' 
attempts to evade Act 250 review by leaving their land in the control 
of other persons during subdivision.286 The court has found that 
subdividers employing such methods had actual or functional control 
of the land and therefore were the subdividers of the land for the 
purpose of determining jurisdiction.287 The Vermont legislature did 
not intend to allow subdividers or developers to avoid review by 
employing these techniques, because such legal fictions would gut 
the substantive provisions of the Act. 288 
Maine's Supreme Judicial Court also has given a broad interpre-
tation to the state's land use jurisdiction provisions. Initially, the 
court extended jurisdiction to residential subdivisions when the Site 
Location Act not only did not specify that it covered them, but 
arguably excluded them.289 Furthermore, the court has supported 
284 Nationally, courts have looked kindly on state land use agencies, setting aside consti-
tutional and administrative challenges. See David E. Hess, Institutionalizing the Revolution: 
Judicial Reaction to State Land-Use Laws, 9 URB. LAW. 183, 183 (1977). 
285 For example, Vermont's expanded definition of "person" was designed specifically to 
prevent land speculators from evading review. 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 1. 
286 See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text. 
288 See In re Eastland, Inc., 151 Vt. 497, 501, 562 A.2d 1043, 1045 (1989). 
289 In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 742 (Me. 1973); see supra notes 177-78 and 
accompanying text. 
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liberal interpretations of the phrase "common scheme of develop-
ment," explicitly announcing its intention to avoid legal fictions.290 
Although Florida courts have been hesitant to to interpret 
ELWMA's standing provisions liberally, it has been willing to give 
the DCA wide leeway determining the Act's jurisdiction. 291 
Judicial support of the state agency responsible for regulating land 
use is important to guarantee that a state land use control statute 
will serve its purpose of providing another level of review for the 
types of developments that a state wants regulated. Allowing legal 
fictions to stand in the way of comprehensive review will result in 
either the collapse of the statute or a draconian redefinition of the 
state's jurisdiction. 
Development interests quickly point out the dangers of liberal 
judicial scrutiny. They tend to dislike additional layers of regulation 
and are especially frustrated when regulation is unnecessarily bur-
densome. 292 The drafters of the Model Code warned against the 
unhappy result when land regulators expend their energy and good 
will defending the outer reaches of their jurisdiction instead of re-
viewing those projects that may have a major impact.293 For that 
reason, restraint on the part of state agencies must accompany the 
liberal judicial interpretation of state land use statutes. 
The best illustration of the need for restraint is Vermont's Road 
Rule.294 The Road Rule is a product of the Environmental Board's 
broad interpretation of the definition of "development" that the Ver-
mont Supreme Court later supported in In re Spencer. 295 The Board's 
use of the construction of a small section of road to assume jurisdic-
tion over a subdivision that by itself did not fit the definition of 
subdivision is trOUbling. The pursuit of that jurisdiction injures the 
credibility of the Board and imperils cooperation from developers. 296 
It also drains the resources of the agency, which ends up reviewing 
290 Brennan v. Saco Constr., Inc., 381 A.2d 656,662 (Me. 1978). 
291 See General Dev. Corp. v. Division of State Planning, 353 So. 2d 1199, 1208 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (court allowed aggregation of properties and reinforced presumptive 
nature of thresholds). 
292 See Goss, supra note 11, at 504 n.12; Walter, supra note 176, at 343. 
293 MODEL CODE, supra note 33, at 272. The drafters noted that "a procedure of state 
review as outlined in this code is likely to be successful only if it concentrates on the truly 
important decisions. If it gets bogged down in a backlog of meaningless paperwork or minor 
decisions, it may create more harm than good." Id. 
294 Vt. Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(A)(6); see supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text. For a 
critique of the Road Rule, see Goss, supra note 11, at 510-28. 
290 152 Vt. 330, 335, 566 A.2d 959, 963-64 (1989). 
296 See Goss, supra note 11, at 504 n.12. 
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subdivisions that most likely would go through review without con-
ditions or rejection anyway. If the justification of the Road Rule is 
that it brings development with environmentally damaging conse-
quences under the umbrella of review, then a better, simpler remedy 
would be asking the legislature for lower thresholds, not creating 
new categories of jurisdiction. The Board needs to balance the pur-
pose behind the Road Rule with its effects. 
Maine's BEP, because the Site Location Act is less open to inter-
pretation, is not as prone to stretching its jurisdiction.297 The Florida 
DCA, however, has room under the "band of presumption" policy 
and its powers of aggregation to stretch its jurisdiction.298 Its broad 
range of discretion may invite abuse and, in the long run, may bring 
strong criticism and even repeal of Florida's statute. Therefore, in 
order for the line between state and local jurisdiction over land use 
to be fair and credible, the courts in a particular state must enforce 
the spirit of the state's land use control law, and the state land use 
control agency must be cautious in its interpretation of its own 
jurisdictional boundaries.299 
One way a state agency can relieve the burden of state review for 
developers or subdividers is to use mechanisms by which the agency 
can pass the review of subdivisions down to qualified municipalities, 
thus merging two levels of review into one. Each state has the option 
of returning meaningful review to the localities.3°O Although it would 
not solve the jurisdiction problems, the procedure partially would 
lessen the burden on the agency and the subdividers, meet the goals 
of the statute, and insure a higher quality of review for those projects 
left under the state's jurisdiction. 
B. Person-Based as Opposed to Land-Based Jurisdiction 
One choice that a state directly regulating subdivisions must face 
is whether to base the jurisdiction of the state land use control 
agency on the person subdividing or on the parcel of land being 
subdivided. A person-based jurisdiction is likely to be more compre-
297 Madore interview, supra note 168. 
298 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(2)(d) (West 1988). 
299 For an example of restraint, see In re Mitchell, Declaratory Judgment No. 203, at 8 
(Vt. Envtl. Bd. 1989), where the Vermont Environmental Board distinguished between affil-
iated parties whose profit arises out of the actual subdivision, and those whose profit is derived 
from construction, thus limiting the possible entanglements of an individual subdivider. 
300 See supra notes 75, 174,235--37 and accompanying text. 
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hensive than a land-based jurisdiction but is also more likely to 
encounter jurisdiction battles. A land-based jurisdiction, though less 
comprehensive, is much clearer and is less likely to result in conflict 
over jurisdiction. 
Vermont's Act 250, by requiring a permit for any person who 
subdivides ten or more lots over five years within the area of a 
district commission, is not basing jurisdiction wholly on the size of 
any particular subdivision, but on the person dividing the land. 301 
For example, a subdivider would face Act 250 review if it subdivided 
a parcel into seven lots, then four years later subdivided another 
parcel, forty miles away, into three lots.302 Because of the subdivi-
der's previous subdivision, the new subdivision would require Act 
250 review.303 A "person's" subdivision activity is what triggers the 
permit requirement, not necessarily the size of the person's subdi-
vision. 
In contrast, the Maine Site Location Act304 and Florida's 
ELWMA305 both provide for land-based jurisdiction. In both states, 
the size of a subdivision alone triggers state review, notwithstanding 
any previous subdivision by the developer or subdivider. 306 In Maine, 
using the same example mentioned above, if one person were sub-
dividing two parcels of land, and each parcel were over twenty acres 
in size, the first parcel of seven lots would be reviewed because it 
would be over five lots. 307 The second parcel would not be reviewed, 
because it would be only three lots. If the first parcel were under 
301 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). Act 250 jurisdiction over commercial 
and industrial "development," as opposed to "subdivisions," could be defined as a land-based 
jurisdiction with a straightforward aggregation policy. Id. § 6001(3). By only considering a 
person's previous "development" within a five-mile radius, instead of within the area of a 
district commission, when determining jurisdiction over a new commercial or industrial "de-
velopment," Act 250 effectively aggregates physically proximate parcels instead of creating a 
person-based jurisdiction, as it does when determining jurisdiction over "subdivisions." 
302 See id. § 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). By themselves, neither the three-parcel subdivision nor 
the seven-parcel subdivision would require review, as neither one is 10 lots. Id. It is only the 
accumulation of the 10 lots within the area of a district commission that triggers review. Id. 
303 Id. Adding the two parcels together, the developer has developed 10 parcels within five 
years within the area of a district commission. See supra notes 94-96, 128-50 and accom-
panying text. 
304 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-490 (West Supp. 1990). 
30Ii FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
S06 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990) (thresholds are set at acreage, 
with no mention of any subdivision or development in other parts of state); FLA. ADMIN. 
CODE ANN. r. 28-24.010 (criterion for jurisdiction is number of dwelling units per develop-
ment). 
S07 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990). 
422 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:385 
twenty acres, neither of the parcels would be reviewed. Maine ig-
nores the previous subdivision activity of the subdivider. 308 
1. The Benefits and Disadvantages of a Person-Based Jurisdiction 
One benefit of a person-based jurisdiction is that it discourages 
land speculation, one of the goals of Vermont's Act 250.309 Large 
corporations subdividing land and reselling it at a profit quickly meet 
their quota of lots subdivided in a given district. A district commis-
sion then reviews any future speculation by these corporations in 
that district. 31o Basically, no company or individual can avoid review 
by keeping its many subdivisions small. 
Another advantage to a person-based jurisdiction is that it is 
inclusive. A zealous state agency would be more likely to review a 
larger proportion of development in a state with a person-based 
rather than with a land-based jurisdiction. Certain methods that a 
subdivider in Maine can use to slip under the Site Location Act's 
threshold of twenty acres and five lots are unavailable in Vermont. 311 
The cumulative impact of the person who creates many small, un-
reviewed subdivisions may be greater than the impact of one person 
with a single, larger, reviewed subdivision. 312 For a legislature in-
terested in a strong jurisdiction with a wide scope, a person-based 
jurisdiction provides the state planning agency with an effective tool 
for comprehensive review. 
308 See id. 
309 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 1. The legislature enacted a broader definition of "person" partly 
due to a "significant increase in the number of land subdivisions which are made for speculative 
purposes." Id. The 1987 changes in Act 250 were accompanied by a land tax aimed at land 
speculators. Id. §§ 6-8 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10003-10005 (1981 
& Supp. 1991»; see supra note 51. 
alO See Hamilton & Clark, supra note 87, at 11. Speculating companies include Cersosimo 
Lumber Company, Eastland, Mountain Lake Properties, Patton Realty Corporation, and 
Properties of America. I d. 
all Rieser, supra note 166, at 338 (description of how developers are able to duck under 
thresholds of Site Location Act review). 
New Jersey has had similar problems with its Coastal Facility Act, which requires a permit 
for any development of 25 dwelling units or more. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:19-3(5), -4 (1979). 
In fact, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection tried to use a 1914 statute 
regulating piers and bulkheads to require permits for all waterfront development to address 
problems caused by development that slipped under the 25-unit threshold. Last Chance Dev. 
Partnership v. Kean, 119 N.J. 425, 433~4, 575 A.2d 427, 43~ (1990). 
812, Rieser, supra note 166, at 388; see also Jurgenson v. County Court for Union County, 
42 Or. App. 505, 508, 600 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Or. Ct. App. 1979). "Viewed in isolation, it is likely 
that no single partitioning has a significant impact on present or future land use; viewed 
cumulatively, it is likely that all partitionings in any given county have a significant impact 
on present or future land use. It would be an elevation of form over substance not to look to 
cumulative impact." Jurgenson, 42 Or. App. at 508, 600 P.2d at 1243. 
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The overriding disadvantage of a person-based jurisdiction is the 
complexity surrounding the question of who is required to undergo 
state review. Developers consider the mere existence of another 
layer of review burdensome.313 Predictability and consistency in a 
statute go a long way toward its acceptance and credibility. 314 
In Vermont, the controversy surrounding the definitions of "per-
son" and "control" illustrates the danger of a complicated definition 
of jurisdiction. 315 The present statutory definition of "person" is ar-
guably overinclusive. 316 The state must count all the previous sub-
divisions that other entities have undertaken in one district during 
the last five years and from which the subdivider in question has 
profited when it is determining Act 250 jurisdiction over any future 
project from which the subdivider may profit. 317 These entities could 
include family members, partners, or a corporation in which the 
subdivider has as little as a five-percent interest.318 The Environ-
mental Board also has construed the definition of "control" broadly, 
further expanding the entanglements that can hinder a subdivider. 319 
As a result of these definitions, determining whether a particular 
subdivision must undergo Act 250 review is not simply a task of 
surveying the size of the subdivision. Because the temptations are 
great for developers to hide past activity in order to avoid Act 250 
review, the Board must inquire into both the family and business 
associations of the developers as well as their past development 
activity. 320 
313 See Goss, supra note 11, at 504 n.12. One commentator cites the ease with which 
opponents to a particular development can stop or slow down a project by using the Act 250 
process and causing the developer to get frustrated and even abandon the project. Id. In 
Florida, developers complain that the DRI process is "time-consuming and expensive." Pel-
ham, supra note 251, at 562; see also Suwannee River Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
State Dep't of Community Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1374 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (court 
recognized its jurisdictional ruling would mean imposition "of yet another restraint upon the 
use and development of property, in addition to those already imposed ... "). 
314 Critics of Act 250 have charged that confidence in the program already has faltered due 
to "discriminatory or inefficient" administration. Goss, supra note 11, at 526 (quoting Gov-
ERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF VERMONT, PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY: 
A STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 24 (1989)). Commentators have stressed the importance of confidence 
in the state land use control agency since the passage of this type of legislation in Maine and 
Vermont. E.g., Walter, supra note 176, at 343. 
316 See supra notes 95-150 and accompanying text. 
316 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991); see supra notes 128-50 and accompanying 
text. 
317 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3), (19). 
318 Id. 
319 See supra notes 105-27 and accompanying text. 
320 Adler interview, supra note 70. Not only the Environmental Board and developers 
experience the problems that a person-based jurisdiction creates. At the time title is passed, 
it is difficult for buyers to be certain whether Act 250 is applicable. Id. 
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Such far-reaching definitions, however, are necessary in a person-
based jurisdiction. A narrow definition of "person" leaves too many 
options through which a particular developer can avoid review using 
family members or dummy corporations and other legal fictions. 321 
A narrow definition of "control" allows a person or entity other than 
the subdivider to own land being subdivided, thus enabling the 
subdivision to avoid review.322 Therefore, problems of uncertainty 
inevitably accompany a person-based jurisdiction. 
2. The Benefits and Disadvantages of a Land-Based Jurisdiction 
In a pure land-based jurisdiction, there would be no "control" issue 
at all. The agency merely would need to determine whether the state 
statute's acreage or lot thresholds are met. Under such a pure land-
based model, a subdivider could line up five tracts side by side; 
subdivide each one, staying just beneath the threshold of state ju-
risdiction within each tract; and call them separate subdivisions-
the subdivider thus entirely would avoid review.323 In defining their 
jurisdiction, however, both Maine and Florida have departed slightly 
from this model. 
Maine altered the pure land-based model by enacting its "common 
scheme of development" policy,324 and Florida by adopting its aggre-
gation policy.325 In both cases, the state can combine two or more 
projects and treat them as the same development. 326 Both states, 
however, must meet strict prerequisites before combining two de-
velopments. 327 Without these prerequisites, developers commencing 
a second project would be uncertain whether the state would com-. 
bine that project with previous projects. The result would be a 
321 See 1987 Vt. Laws 64, § 1. The legislature amended the statute to avoid such occurences. 
"[I]n order to ensure appropriate Act 250 review, it is necessary to treat persons with an 
affiliation for profit, consideration, or some other beneficial interest derived from the partition 
or division of land as a single person for the purpose of determining whether a particular 
conveyance is subject to Act 250 jurisdiction." Id. 
822 See supra notes 105-27 and accompanying text. 
323 There is nothing in Maine's definition of "subdivision" that would prevent such devel-
opment as long as each subdivision were under five lots or 20 acres. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990). Likewise, the Florida regulations would not prevent such 
a development as long as the number of units was below 80% of the threshold for that county. 
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-24.010 (1989). 
324 Me. Dep't of Envtl. Protection Reg. c. 371, § l(c); see also Board of Envtl. Protection 
v. Bergeron, 434 A.2d 25, 27 (Me. 1981). 
326 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.0651(4) (West Supp. 1991). 
326 See supra notes 202-06, 273-83 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra notes 202-06, 278-83 and accompanying text. 
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problem similar to that created by a person-based jurisdiction, where 
the previous subdivision activity by a landowner would be an issue 
complicating the determination of state jurisdiction. 
The workability of a land-based jurisdiction outweighs the com-
prehensiveness of Vermont's person-based jurisdiction. Primarily, 
the determination of jurisdiction is not intended to require a large 
quantity of information; such research should be saved for the re-
view. It is not worth the cost in either resources or good will for a 
state agency to require a complicated procedure to determine 
whether state review is necessary. 
The promulgation of a few narrowly defined rules can minimize 
the cumulative growth that a land-based jurisdiction fosters. If cu-
mulative growth is a problem, the state can lower its thresholds.328 
As long as a state has the ability to undertake the increased quantity 
of review, low thresholds will discourage developers from evading 
jurisdiction, because subdividing land into a series of small parcels 
to escape review would be more burdensome than undergoing the 
review itself. 
In order to deter land speculation within the framework of a land-
based jurisdiction, a state agency could adopt a tax similar to Ver-
mont's capital gains tax on land,329 or a licensing program for large 
developers. Such a program would require licenses for any developer 
who subdivides more than a certain number of lots. Although decid-
ing which developers must obtain licenses would create many of the 
same problems inherent in a person-based jurisdiction, the thresh-
olds for the licensing program could be high enough to eliminate all 
but the larger developers, allowing the state agency easily to identify 
them. Ideally, a state agency could develop a working relationship 
with those developers that would both secure the rights of the 
developers and further environmental goals. In addition, smaller 
subdividers could ascertain quickly whether their subdivision re-
quired review. 
Any land-based jurisdiction must be accompanied by a good ag-
gregation policy. One approach to aggregation is the automatic com-
bination of any developments within a reasonable radius. 330 Under 
328 If a state land use agency could handle a large number of applications efficiently, one 
option would be to allow the agency to review any parcel of 10 or more acres that is subdivided 
into two or more lots. Such a jurisdiction would be both simple and comprehensive. Adler 
interview, supra note 70. 
329 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-10010 (1981 & Supp. 1991); see supra note 51. 
330 The idea of a radius is presently utilized in Vermont in the regulation of non-subdivision 
developments. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
426 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:385 
this approach, if any two subdivisions or developments by the same 
person were within the same radius, they would count as the same 
development. 331 Although adopting this approach would change the 
issue from one of defining a common scheme of development to one 
of defining a person, using a small radius would make implementing 
the approach less complicated than enforcing a person-based juris-
diction. If the state applies its aggregation policy to prevent devel-
opers from avoiding review for large developments, the policy should 
not result in any added regulatory burden. In sum, the best juris-
diction policy would be the combination of a land-based jurisdiction 
with a strong aggregation policy, fortified by some control of land 
speculation. 
C. Criteria/or Establishing Jurisdiction 
When defining jurisdiction for a state permitting program, the 
state legislature must consider what criteria are appropriate and 
how much flexibility the criteria will allow. The best criteria will 
serve the purpose of the state statute. Florida's ELWMA seeks 
greater regulation of developments that will have a regional im-
pact.332 Therefore, the best criteria to define Florida's jurisdiction 
would include any development with an impact beyond a local gov-
ernment's borders. 333 The Maine statute seeks to give the state the 
authority to regulate those developments that, by their size and 
nature, substantially may affect Maine's environment and quality of 
life.334 Therefore, besides size-related criteria, Maine may want to 
develop standards by which to differentiate developments that will 
have a significant impact. The intention of the Vermont statute is to 
control as much of the state's development as possible while limiting 
that control to avoid bureaucratic problems. 335 Vermont, then, should 
seek to establish criteria enabling efficient regulation of land use. 
A state legislature must decide which criteria to use to meet its 
goals. The Florida legislature has determined ELWMA's jurisdiction 
using thresholds that differ depending on the type of development 
proposed.336 Maine and Vermont's state agencies must consider only 
331 [d. 
332 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(1) (West 1988). 
333 Id. 
334 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 (West 1989). 
335 In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 76, 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1982). 
336 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. IT. 28-24.001 to 28-24.032; see supra notes 259-61 and accom-
panying text. New York's Adirondack Park Agency simply lists specific types of development 
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the size of the development, either in acreage or in the number of 
lots to be created. 337 
U sing size as a criterion for all development would mean using 
the same standard to determine jurisdiction for highways, homes, 
gravel pits, paper mills, fast food restaurants, and ski areas,338 even 
though the effect of a particular type of development on the health 
and welfare of surrounding residents may not have much to do with 
the acreage it consumes. Therefore, the Florida approach, which 
applies different criteria according to the type of project, provides 
greater assurance that developments with the greatest impact will 
get reviewed. For residential developments and subdivisions alone, 
however, the use of size as a jurisdictional criterion is logical, because 
it is indicative of other possible criteria, such as number of people, 
amount of traffic, and impact on sewage and water services, that 
would reflect the effect of such land use. Therefore, although differ-
ent criteria may be useful for other types of development, size-in 
terms of acreage or number of parcels-is appropriate for subdivi-
sions and residential developments. 
A more difficult issue, after deciding what criteria to use, is how 
flexible to make those criteria. The goals of the three state land use 
statutes, especially those of Maine and Florida, would seem to re-
quire each reviewing state agency, on a case-by-case basis, to use 
its discretion in deciding which projects merit review. 339 On one 
hand, such a system would represent the extreme in flexibility and 
might provide too little certainty for a statewide land use permitting 
system. On the other hand, some flexibility is useful to prevent 
subdividers from ducking review by regularly designing projects 
without enough lots or enough acreage to trigger state jurisdiction. 
With flexibility, a state agency could let harmless developments go 
that automatically are reviewed due to their location. N. Y. EXEC. LAW § 810 (McKinney 1982 
& Supp. 1991). 
337 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 6001(19) (Supp. 1991). 
338 In both Maine and Vermont, the thresholds for a "development" apply to any of these 
commercial uses of the land. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(2) (West 1989); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
339 Florida has tried to maintain agency discretion by using the present thresholds. See 
General Dev. Corp. v. Division of State Planning, 353 So. 2d 1199, 1208-09 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978). The Maine statute claims that it grants the state agency the "discretion" to 
regulate those developments that impact the environment. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 
§ 481 (West 1989). 
After jurisdiction is established, each state is able to exercise significant discretion within 
certain criteria when determining approval of the development. See id. § 484; VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10, § 6086 (1984 & Supp. 1991); see also Brett, supra note 171, at 41. 
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without review, yet catch small developments with significant or 
unique environmental impacts. 340 
Presently, Maine and Florida are at opposite ends of the flexibility 
spectrum. Maine's jurisdiction is straightforward-unless there is a 
"common scheme" issue, the BEP simply looks at acreage and the 
number of lots subdivided in the last five years. 341 On the other hand, 
Florida uses both presumed thresholds and staggered thresholds to 
identify DR Is, thus allowing for greater flexibility in the determi-
nation of jurisdiction. 342 
The Florida experiment, using presumed rather than conclusive 
thresholds to define ELWMA'sjurisdiction, has had mixed results.343 
The 1985 amendments creating the DCA's "band of presumption" 
reflected the state legislature's recognition of the need for more 
certainty.344 The DCA's earlier approach was too indefinite for de-
velopers planning future projects. They were unsure if a given de-
velopment would be forced to go through an added layer of review. 345 
This approach was also inefficient, because the state's decision re-
garding whether to subject the development to review required a 
good deal of information concerning the development's impact. It 
imposed an increased burden on the developer, who had to collect 
the required information and wait for a result before the actual 
review process even began.346 The state added certainty but main-
tained flexibility when it amended the statute to allow the DCA the 
"band of presumption. "347 This "band of presumption," providing the 
DCA with the discretion to require review for projects sized between 
eighty percent and 120% of the threshold, enables the agency to 
assure state review of developments either located in environmen-
tally sensitive areas or having some characteristic that would cause 
regional impact yet not meet the threshold required for jurisdic-
tion. 348 
340 For example, in Maine, a 19-acre plot may include unusual plants or be located on an 
island in the middle of a lake. If Maine had flexible thresholds, the BEP could review the 
subdivision; with rigid thresholds, it cannot. Likewise, one purpose of Vermont's Act 250, 
historic preservation, is not met as many historic properties are below the size threshold of a 
development. Robert L. McCullough, Historic Preservation and Land Use Control at the 
State Level-Vermont's Act 250, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1986). 
341 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990). 
342 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(2)(d) (West 1988); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-24.010 
(1988). 
343 See Pelham, supra note 251, at 562. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Id. 
347 Id. 
348 If the development does not meet the threshold, the burden is on the DCA to show that 
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Unlike Florida, Maine's straightforward, five-lot, twenty-acre re-
quirement allows developers to know with certainty when review is 
required, and makes jurisdictional decisions easy for the BEP.349 The 
state, however, has been unable to control the resulting proliferation 
of 19- to 19.9-acre parcels. 350 In the past, rigid acreage exceptions, 
such as Vermont's old ten-acre rule and Maine's former requirement 
of minimum lot sizes, created similar problems. 351 Any rigid thresh-
old results in much development that is sized immediately below the 
threshold by developers that are seeking to avoid review. 
In spite of the problems with rigid thresholds, they are more 
appropriate than presumptive thresholds for the determination of 
jurisdiction. The strongest argument in favor of presumptive thresh-
olds is that a subdivision that falls below such a threshold, but by 
its nature or location may cause severe environmental damage, still 
will undergo review. A state could protect land prone to environ-
mental damage, however, by using staggered thresholds,352 desig-
nated fragile areas of critical concern,353 or special permit programs 
for fragile natural classifications such as wetlands. 354 
Perhaps the most clear, concise method of providing the different 
levels of protection that different regions of the state may require 
is the use of staggered thresholds, which do not have the uncertainty 
of presumptions. Florida successfully uses staggered thresholds. 355 
ELWMA jurisdiction begins with smaller residential developments 
in less populated counties rather than in more populous counties. 356 
In addition, states seeking to heighten scrutiny in areas without 
zoning could use staggered thresholds to guarantee better review in 
those areas. 357 Furthermore, staggered thresholds could protect en-
vironmentally sensitive areas by requiring state review at a lower 
threshold for subdivisions or development in areas such as water-
front, wetlands, or watersheds feeding drinking supplies. 358 The re-
the development is a DR!. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(2)(d) (West 1988). Likewise, if the 
development is over the threshold, the burden is on the developer to show that its development 
is not a DR!. Id. 
849 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482(5) (West Supp. 1990). 
350 Madore interview, supra note 168; see supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
351 See supra notes 84-89, 187-96 and accompanying text. 
352 See infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text. 
353 See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, § 7-201; supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
354 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-l to 13:9B-30 (West Supp. 1991) (state permit 
required for development in wetlands); see McCullough, supra note 340, at 3. 
356 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-24.010 (1989); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 33, § 7-
301(2)(0. 
366 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-24.010 (1989). 
357 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1991). 
358 One jurisdiction that uses staggered thresholds is the Adirondack Park Agency. N.Y. 
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suIt of staggered thresholds is that developments not needing to 
undergo state review can avoid the process without the sacrifice of 
certainty. Instead, state review would occur more often where it is 
needed most. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Among states that directly regulate the development of land, there 
are different approaches toward determining the allocation of regu-
latory duties between the state and local governments. When decid-
ing the jurisdiction of its land use agency, a state must balance the 
burden of regulation with the goals of its land use control statute. 
The most workable method of defining jurisdiction, based on a 
review of the Vermont, Maine, and Florida state land use statutes, 
is a land-based jurisdiction that has thresholds staggered according 
to location and designed to reflect environmental concerns. Whatever 
the method of determining jurisdiction, in order for state review to 
work, courts must defer to the agency's expertise, and the agency 
must show restraint in taking advantage of the courts' deference. If 
a state decides on a more complicated or comprehensive method of 
determining jurisdiction, the agency must be prepared to enforce it 
efficiently and fairly. 
Where states create their own systems of land use regulation, 
efficient and workable methods of determining the state's jurisdiction 
will enhance the credibility of the state's land use control system 
and show that state land use control can have a positive effect on 
environmental quality. 
EXEC. LAW §§ 809-810 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The Agency divides all private land 
within the region into five categories based on use intensity. It requires review of subdivisions 
meeting the following thresholds: 
Location 
Hamlet areas 
Moderate intensity 
Low intensity 
Rural Use 
Resource Management 
Units or Lots 
Zoned 
100 
75 
35 
20 
2 
Unzoned 
100 
15 
10 
5 
2 
[d. § 810. Jurisdictional thresholds for other types of development use different criteria. [d. 
